Publications

This is the first in a series of papers on Proportional Representation (PR) and the quota system in Zimbabwe, and a follow up on an initial paper published by RAU(Matyszak. 2013) on the confusion about Proportional Representation. Whilst RAU recognises that citizen participation is generally the key to holding duty bearers accountable, it also acknowledges the integral role of women and youth, despite the fact that their voices continue to be marginalised. 
 
The reasons vary but the attitudes about women and youth have to change given that these two groups constitute the largest sections in our population: women are 52% of the total populations according to the 2012 census, whilst youth, those under 35 years, are 67.8%, an enormous “youth bulge”. Full participation of citizens is at the cornerstone of democracy and this can never be achieved if one dominant section of the population continues to speak on behalf of others. This paper adds voice to this conversation and explores why efforts to increase women participation in public spaces in Zimbabwe continue to suffer a still-birth where the argument is twisted to blame the same women for not taking the ‘opportunities’ availed. Whilst there might be problems of slow uptake, it is the principle of nothing for us without us that must motivate political systems to ensure that women fully participate in all structures of society, and this should also be reflected in the political parties. 

A serious question in gender politics is the participation of women in politics and particularly in representative politics. In Zimbabwe, this has been addressed through a proportional representation mechanism that has added 60 women to parliament, but, however, this is due to a quota system, and, the number of women directly elected has dropped significantly. Representation is however not the only issue of importance, and the participation of women in political life generally is equally important.
In Africa, survey research suggests that there are actually few differences between men and women: women are more likely to support one-party states and were generally more ambivalent in their views. In Zimbabwe, research suggests similar attitudes amongst women, but also reveals marked differences between rural and urban women, as well as differences due to age. It may also be that there are differences due to social class, but this is an area that is poorly researched, as Everjoice Win has pointed out (Win. 2004).
It is a conventional position that the middle-classes are the staunchest defenders of democracy, but recent research in Zimbabwe suggests that this is not the case in Zimbabwe. In this study, the educated, employed and urban, who may be crudely described as “middle-class”, were shown to be mostly uninvolved in the socio-political life of the country, and were described as “disconnected democrats” (RAU. 2015). Did this apply equally to men and women, especially as women are frequently argued to exercise less agency than men?

This paper takes a preliminary look at middle-class young women under 35, to ascertain their views of politics in Zimbabwe today. These are educated and professional women holding jobs in the corporate sector, civil society or running their own businesses. They have strong opinions on politics and at the same time are cautious in engaging in active politics even though they have the financial means, the educational backing and the skills to do so.

A report by the Institute of Development Studies in conjunction with the Research And Advocacy Unit titled: The Violent Politics of Informal Work and How Young People Navigate Them: A Conceptual Framework explores the linkages between young people’s economic engagement and their social and political engagement in contexts of violence in Africa. 
 
The enquiry started from the assumption that, in the everyday lives of young people in Africa, engagement in formal or informal livelihood activities is rarely separated from their social lives and politics, especially the politics that operate in the local economy. 
 
As young people are embedded in social and, possibly, also in political relationships, the ways in which they pursue opportunities for work will depend not only on their skills and demand for labour, but on their navigation of the political actors that shape the nature of the local labour market and economy. 
 
These issues become all the more complex in settings that are in the middle of, or recovering from, violent conflict; or are otherwise affected by high levels of violence. In these settings, the politics of the local economy might be entangled with the dynamics that sustain the violence.
 
Why is this important, and why now? 
 
The year 2015 saw an historical peak in youth unemployment, with 74 million young people in the 15 to 24 year age group unemployed worldwide (UNDP 2015). The highest youth unemployment rate was in the Arab states with 29 per cent; the youth unemployment rates in East Asia and Pacific and in sub-Saharan Africa are respectively 18.6 per cent and 13.5 per cent, while the world’s average is 15 per cent (ibid.: 64). 
 
In policy circles and in the field of international development, high levels of youth unemployment are considered problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, it will have a negative impact on young people as they seek to sustain their livelihoods and further the development and wellbeing of their families, and it will negatively affect economic development of the country at large. 
 
Second, the presence of demographic youth bulges (where youth form the majority of the population) and youth unemployment are regularly associated with increased levels of instability in a country and, in the age of the so-called ‘war on terrorism’, with the increased risk of radicalisation that encourages young people to join extremist groups (UNDP 2015), despite the fact that there are major evidence gaps to support these claims (Cramer 2010).
 
The association of large numbers of unemployed youth with instability has urged international development actors to develop and support youth employment and entrepreneurship programmes, many of which aim to not just improve young people’s employability and material conditions, but also to foster peace and conflict transformation (Boudreaux 2007; Williams 2008).
 
 Given the importance of informal work for young people, there are also calls to focus interventions on the informal economy (Fox, Senbet and Simbanegavi 2016). However, others argue that the informal economy cannot provide definite and sustainable solutions because it cannot absorb all unemployed youth (Hansen 2010). 
 
More critical voices, such as Munive (2010), point out that too often ideas about the ‘crisis of youth’ means that the issue of youth (un)employment is securitised by state actors. and international agencies, and that young people are objectified. Moreover, there are many ‘unknowns’ about the linkages between forms of youth engagement in the economic, social and political sphere, particularly for contexts of violence. 
 
Concerning entrepreneurship, Tobias, Mair and Barbosa-Leiker (2013) argue that little is known about the mechanisms that might lead to entrepreneurship playing a role in promoting peace, and in general there is only fragmented knowledge about how entrepreneurship can produce social change. There is, therefore, a need for critical research into how young people deal with unemployment and navigate opportunities in the informal sector, and how this might relate to other forms of social and political action.
 
The objective of this Evidence Report is to develop a conceptual framework for studying the links between young people’s economic activities in the informal economy and forms of social and political engagement, in contexts affected by violent conflict. The report puts the agency of young people at the centre of the enquiry, and relates this to the question of youth identity: young people’s awareness about what ‘youth’ means in a particular context, how this has implications for their agency, and their perspectives on how work relates to the process of ‘becoming’ adults. This requires attention to be paid to social differentiation among the highly diverse social category of ‘youth’ and the multiple identities that young people ascribe to, which affect their experiences and possibilities in the informal economy as well as their agency.
 
The conceptual framework will enable research on the politics of youth employment and youth entrepreneurship, and the meaning of work for youth identities, to address the following questions that are relevant for policy and programmes: How can programmes that support economic activities among youth be implemented with due attention for local and
 
national politics? Might these programmes be improved in a way that they may also strengthen social and political engagement among youth?

 

Last year - 2015 was a busy for RAU and 30 reports, opinion pieces and blogs were producedunder  three thematic areas as stated in the Strategic Plan, 2015- 2022.
All these are available on our website.
To read more about activities and challenges please read our Annual Report 2015 which has been uploaded onto the website. 
If you want any further information please contact the Research and Advocacy Unit on landline - 302764 or on email - info@rau.co.zw
 

 

Mass displacements have happened regularly in both the short history of Zimbabwe, as well as in the history of Rhodesia before Independence in 1980. Displacement, control of food, and torture are the recurring themes of Zimbabwean political life for more than three decades now.
This report explores how events of the past can be an opportunity for a country emerging from violent conflict to learn from its mistakes, and to set in place mechanisms, both legal and social, to prevent recurrences. 
  

On May 10, 2016, Parliament interviewed 23 candidates battling it out for 6 positions on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. The interviewing panel appointed by Parliament’s Standing Rules and Order committee interviewed prospective commissioners that included former ZEC commissioners, academics, lawyers, educationists and a member of the clergy.
 
 
In this piece - Research and Advocacy Unit senior researcher Derek Matyszak provides readers with an insightful analysis of the process.

Violence has been woven through the intricate fabric of Zimbabwe’s political history in various forms which include murder, beatings, rape, death threats, abductions, arbitrary arrests, torture, forced displacement, property damage, harassment, intimidation and terrorisation. It has been used as the weapon of choice by the governments in power since the declaration of UDI in 1966 through to post Independent Zimbabwe as a measure to ensure retention of power at all costs.
 
This systemic assault has had the desired effect of ensuring the nation is risk averse and as shown in the Afrobarometer surveys citizens are careful about what they say in public and “that civil society, with few exceptions, can be described as “risk averse” (Masunungure,2006), and other commentators point out the apparent passivity of Zimbabweans in challenging the state (Mills, 2014).
 
Much of the analysis of “risk aversion” centres on the fear generated by a highly coercive state. For example, Afrobarometer surveys from 1999 show a marked increase in the number of citizens who say that are careful about what they say in public, “often” or “always” – increasing from 59% in 1999 to 89% in 2014. This is further supported by a recent analysis of political risk in Africa, which included Zimbabwe (Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, 2015).
In this Political and Economic Assessment, the Research and Advocacy Unit in it’s review of landmark events in the country’s political history explores the possibility that deteriorating standards and conditions in the country may be pushing people to take action. 
 
Also highlighted in this PEA is the notion that citizens are less focused on elections, political violence and Constitutionalism and more concentrated on the issues that affect their everyday lives such as the economy, employment, food security, health and even crime and security.
It is probable that the deterioration in Zimbabweans livelihoods is adding to a new assertiveness, as was seen in the response of the vendors to attempts to displace them from the cities (RAU,2015).
A weak adherence to the rule of law and compromised judiciary has had an adverse effect on Zimbabwe’s economy, resulting in socio-economic deprivation for the majority of Zimbabweans. 
The country has undergone an extensive period of ineffective economic management resulting in an informalised economy to the extent, that some estimate 90% of employment is petty trade, vending, and artisanal mining.  Added to the equation are the collapsing infrastructure and the costs of rotten roads, erratic power, poor sewage and sanitation as cities become hubs for those fleeing rural collapse, especially with current and future impact of climate change and the severe drought.
The Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVac) estimates that three million Zimbabweans will be food insecure in 2016-2017.
The state which has been dominated by the immense power centralised in the presidency and Robert Mugabe, is facing internal challenges by way of factionalism within the party. The contentious confrontation between the two factions is spilling into all sectors of society. This is evidenced by which there are conflicting positions on policy by government officials. President Mugabe 
A critical issue for both political parties and civil society, but rarely acted upon, is the fact that the passing of the amended constitution into law in 2013 rendered all legislation inoperative and unenforceable that was at base ultra vires the constitution. However, the government and government agencies persist in implementing unconstitutional laws and regulations, apparently under illusion that these laws remain operative until new or amended legislation is put in place.
The recent mass demonstration by the MDC-T in Harare may be an indicator that Zimbabweans are more willing to take risks. Here it is also important to note that this demonstration was also an indicator of the ways in which the new constitution, underpinned by the courts, may be creating new spaces for civic action. 
 
The PEA - Conflict or Collapse - Zimbabwe in 2016 also suggests that there may be a need to shift from “big” to “small” politics as this may provide considerable traction in developing peace and reducing conflict, particularly because the issues in “small” politics rise above narrow political party matters.

For two long years, South Africans have been waiting to see whether the findings of the Public Protector’s report on the expenditure at President Jacob Zuma’s Nkandla residence would be upheld by the courts.
In this analysis, Tony Reeler examines why this decision is particularly poignant for Zimbabwe and more importantly, to see the virtue of a country not only having courts robust enough to deal with the executive, but to also appreciate how the principle of constitutionalism was defended so strongly.

On the 19th March, 2016 Minister Zhuwao announced that the Indigenisation Levy which he had proposed in a Government Notice of the 8th January, 2016 was now "off the table" and that firms would be required to comply "with the law" before the 1st April, 2016 or "stop operating". The Government Notice, the “Framework, Procedures and Guidelines for Implementing the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act” was extensively analysed by RAU in an article entitled Chaos Clarified, posted on this website. The analysis considered the legality of the Framework generally, including the supposed 1st April, 2106 deadline, and exactly what required compliance.
 
This brief article by Derek Matyszak follows on from that article and shows how government policy is being rendered dysfunctional by ZANU PF factionalism and how far the Indigenisation Programme resembles farce, is divorced from reality and in no way reflects a government serious about attracting investment.

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