Zimbabwe’s current Inclusive Government, more commonly referred to as a Government of National Unity (GNU), was established pursuant to an Interparty Political Agreement, itself more commonly referred to as the Global Political Agreement (GPA). This Agreement was signed by the “Principals” of the three main extant political parties: the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations. Rather than simply containing clauses which are subject to legal interpretation and enforcement, the larger part of the agreement comprises rhetoric and ideological bombast designed to facilitate political posturing and little else. The ideological bombast is symptomatic of the lack of any real consensus between the parties, and the GPA thus reflected a continuation of this discord rather than its resolution. This paper analyses whether the GPA contains any real provision for reform in Zimbabwe.
This paper examines the use of internation criminal law. particularly the uise of the Rome Statute and ICC, to combat crimes against humanity in Zimbabwe.
This paper suggests that SADC, in its relationship with Zimbabwe, behaves like a drunk who insists on looking for keys under a street light because that is the only place he can see clearly. The paper suggests that there are other ways of approaching the Zimbabwe crisis other than through the ill founded enthusiasm for a unity government.
The MDC has long been suspicious of any claim by Thabo Mbeki to be an honest broker in the Zimbabwe crisis, having raised concerns in this regard from the moment South Africa showed itself willing to endorse the fraudulent elections of 2000. Recently, calls by the MDC for Mbeki to recuse himself as a facilitator to an accord between the parties have grown louder. Given the track record of the Mbeki administration towards Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe, the only cause for any surprise is that Mbeki should have been allowed to occupy the position of facilitator at all. This paper disputes the notion that Mbeki`s quiet diplomacy should be view as quiet pressure on Mugabe, but rather as tacit support and cover that it is impolitic to provide "loudly".
At a time when the results of Zimbabwe`s presidential election were being withheld, this paper makes various deductions about the result of that poll from the Senate and House of Assembly results.
This paper considers the fact that the 2008 presidential election is now a three horse race and, for the first time, all three candidates may garner a significant number of votes. The paper considers possible scenarios against varying percentages polled by each.
Ahead of the March 2008 poll, this paper looks at factionalism within ZANU PF, the defection of Simba Makoni and his entry into the race for the Presidency