



An analysis of the recent political developments in Zimbabwe.

Research & Advocacy Unit (RAU)

Background

This is the second time in this country's history that the country has been precipitated into a constitutional crisis. The first was in 1965 with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Smith government, and second is the coup that took place in November 2017. ¹Whilst both looked innocuous at the beginning, the long-term consequences might not be so. UDI took a long time before the real consequences became apparent, and a bloody civil war emerged. It is to be hoped that this new constitutional crisis will not have such serious long-term consequences.

The conditions leading to the coup

It is crucial to any understanding of the current crisis to recognise the growth of the *securocrat state*. This was described in considerable detail last year in Ibbo Mandaza's analysis of the "securocrat state", ² and we not need to go into all the details and the lengthy history, but merely deal with the process of military capture of the state in the past decade.

The period following the Unity Accord in 1987 through the 1990s was largely a period of peace with an absence of political violence. This is not to period saw the growth of an increasingly assertive civil society, a powerful labour movement, and the emergence of a variety of human rights groups. This was quickly followed by a very assertive and popular citizen-driven constitutional process under the NCA, and finally the birth of the MDC. The military were not an obvious factor in dealing with the increasing threat to ZANU-PF's hegemony.

To all intents and purposes this ended in 1998 with the Food Riots, and the mass expression of dissatisfaction of ordinary citizens with the state. This saw the army on the streets and against the citizens for the first time since 1987, and severe human rights violations were recorded. ³ This was followed by the defeat of ZANU-PF's constitution in 2000, its first major reversal in 20 years. The regime now faced a very serious challenge, and rapidly moved to eliminate the threat, and it did so in several ways:

- The neutralising and finally capturing the judiciary;

¹ That this was a coup remains the position of Zimbabwean civil society. See Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, *CiZC Statement on SONA*. 21 December 2017.

² Mandaza, I (2016), *Introduction*. in I Mandaza, (2016) *The Political Economy of the State in Zimbabwe: The rise and fall of the Securocrat State*. Harare: Southern African Political Economy Series.

³ Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (1998), *Human Rights in Troubled Times: An Initial Report on Human Rights Abuses During and After Food Riots in January 1998*. Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (1999), *A Consolidated Report on the Food Riots 19–23 January 1998*, Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.

- Releasing paramilitary forces, undoubtedly under the control of the various branches of the security forces, to ensure electoral victories in 2000 and 2002;
- Beginning the general deployment of the military into civilian positions;
- Smashing the human resource of the MDC through Operation Murambatsvina;
- And, finally, a sustained assault on human rights defenders, journalists, and all potential opposition forces.

Whilst this strategy ensured victory in the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections, it is evident that a combination of Operation Murambatsvina, the total melt-down of the economy, and the moves to create an electoral crisis by factions within ZANU-PF and their allies, resulted in the remarkable defeat of Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF in the 2008 elections.⁴ The crisis could have been easily resolved by forthright action by SADC and the AU: it merely required them to insist on the result standing, demand a transfer of power, and Zimbabwe might have developed very differently in the next decade.⁵ This did not happen.

Whatever the speculation about whether Mugabe wanted to step down, or he demanded that he be protected from stepping down, the fact is that the military took charge and “won” the result of the presidential re-run. Some have called this the first coup, and even senior ZANU-PF officials are candid that the military took charge and ensured the result. This result was rejected by everyone.

Thus, this action was only partially successful, but it did produce the peace treaty known as the Global Political Agreement, and the creation of the Inclusive Government. Whilst this was euphemistically called a transition, and major reforms were supposed to take place, little really changed. ZANU-PF kept the major organs of power, and the security forces refused to accept the civilian authority of the MDCs. The statements of senior military officials refusing to accept the civilian authority of the part of the government occupied by the two opposition parties are notorious and common cause.

During the life of the Inclusive Government, civil society became obsessed once more with constitutional reform rather than reform of the state, and this became highly divisive within civil society, taking the focus off the reform of state institutions. This is not to denigrate the achievement of the amended constitution, but rather to point out that the cynics were right: **this was a peace treaty and not a transition**. The constitutional process took right up until the gate of the 2013 poll, too late to have any effect on reforming the state, and ZANU-PF, through its prevaricating and obstructing, merely bided its time and energy in preparation for the 2013 elections.⁶

The 2013 elections came as a thunderbolt to everyone, even to many members of ZANU-PF who could hardly believe that they had won their seats. But the effect was dramatic: Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF were re-elected by a landslide, won back their two-thirds majority, and opposition parties were thrown into total disarray. It seemed irrelevant to all that the

⁴ Reeler, A. P. (2017), *Operation Murambatsvina and its effects on political participation*. May 2017. MPOI & RAU. [<http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/governance-0>]

⁵ Kwinjeh. G (2008), *Staring a gift horse in the mouth. Death Spiral in Zimbabwe: Mediation, Violence and the GNU*. 18 June 2008. Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit. [<http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/future-zimbabwe-4>]

⁶ This conformed to the “most likely scenario”, most of the predictions were correct save that the election in 2013 was not violent. Here see RAU (2010), *What are the options for Zimbabwe? Dealing with the obvious!* Report produced by the Governance Programme. 4 May 2010. Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit. [<http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/activism-20>]

election result defied political reality: Robert Mugabe got more than a million more votes than Morgan Tsvangirai, and careful analysis could not establish how this was possible.⁷ Furthermore, the basis for the alleged swing in the loyalty of the voters was subsequently shown to suggest rigging.⁸

The obvious next step for the victors was to build on the advantages given them by the GNU, make the small, but obvious decisions that would produce re-engagement with the international world. The steps were easy and all were agreed at the SAPES/Ned Conference in 2014 that only a few essential steps would be necessary:

- Create policy consistency;
- Clear commitment on the protection of property rights;
- Re-define the conditions for investment by changing the indigenisation theology;
- Undertake a land audit;
- Rehabilitate and rationalise the parastatal sector.

None of this happened. Rather ZANU-PF went into a sustained conflict over succession, a conflict that had been brewing ever since Dzikamai Mavahaire raised the issue in 1999, and exacerbated in 2004 with the Tsholotsho Declaration. However, it now appears that the most recent internal conflict was less a faction fight between Lacoste and G40 than a sustained purge to remove the over-weaning power of the military that had been gaining in power since 2008.

The story of the last stages of the inevitable coup are now commonplace.

First, it began with the purge of the Mujuru faction. This started with the death (or murder) of Solomon Mujuru, culminated in the expulsion of the entire Mujuru faction, and almost decimated the party. However, this purge obviously opened the space for Mnangagwa and the military, and the deeper problem began to manifest itself.

Then began the slow and relentless campaign against Mnangagwa, and the attempt to limit the power of the military. This has led inevitably to the events of the past few weeks, and the unfolding of a strategy that clearly was a long time in the brewing. It is very hard to believe that the events of the past few weeks were a spontaneous response to the sacking of Mnangagwa and Chiwenga: the process seems far too well-organised to believe this.

Here we are today and facing the overthrow of the constitution.

Has there been a coup?

It seems to be the fact that no-one is willing to face this publicly, and derives quite simply from the actions of the military. Whether we call this a military assisted transition the enforced resignation of the president, a “soft coup”, or even the “non-coup” coup, the military came onto the streets in defiance of the constitution. We might all celebrate the removal of Robert Mugabe, but the manner of his removal violated the constitution. Any cursory reading of the Constitution will tell you this. Furthermore, support of the people, after

⁷ RAU (2014), "*Numbers out of Tune? An examination of the vote in Harmonised July 2013 Election.*" Full Report. Governance Programme, Research and Advocacy Unit [RAU] 10th April 2014, Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit. [<http://researchandadvocacyunit.org/publication/feminism-4>]

⁸ Bratton, M., Dulani, B., & Masunungure, E. (2016). *Detecting manipulation in authoritarian elections: Survey-based methods in Zimbabwe*. *Electoral Studies*, 42, 10-21. [<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379416000068>]

and not before the coup, was not for the army but against Robert Mugabe, and, without the guarantee of safety by the army, it is extremely doubtful that there would have been mass demonstrations. Recent work by MPOI and RAU strongly indicates how “risk averse” Zimbabwean citizens actually are.⁹

Lest there be any doubt that a coup took place, look at the Constitution. **Section 110** gives the responsibility only to President to deploy the defence forces. **Section 113** gives power only to the President to declare a state of emergency. Section 208 requires the security forces to act within the constitution, be wholly non-partisan, forbids them to act in support of any political party or cause. **Section 212** requires the Defence Forces *to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its territorial integrity and to uphold this Constitution*. **Section 213** gives only to the President the power to deploy the Defence Forces. And, finally, **Section 214** requires the President to expeditiously inform parliament when he deploys the Defence Forces.

Here it is worth a careful reading of Alex Magaisa’s last two Big Saturday Reads, and note also the number of violations of the Constitution that still continue. The first draws attention to the one very dangerous judgement by Justice George Chiweshe, which suggests, possibly drawing on Section 212, that there are conditions in which the Defence Forces can determine for themselves when they need to protect the country, etc.¹⁰ He points out that the basis for this judgement requires the most urgent challenge. The notion in this judgement, that the military can determine for themselves when the constitution or the state is under threat, creates a power outside the executive, parliament and the courts. This most certainly is not what the constitution intended, bluntly allows legal coups, and seems manifestly unconstitutional.

Even if the judgement did attempt to draw upon Section 212 as justification for the intervention of the army in civilian affairs, it seems unlikely that a superior court could uphold this, as Section 212 would have to be read together with all the other Sections indicated above. Taken all together, it is evident that the Constitution envisages the military remaining wholly under civilian authority, only deployed by civilian, and nowhere suggests that the military have any independent power to deploy themselves ever.

Magaisa’s second article point out the number of other ways in which the Constitution continues to be violated: both in the delay in the appointment of a Vice or Vice-Presidents, and the more serious problem of the military remaining in civilian space in the absence of an order by the President under Section 113, and/or the failure to notify Parliament under Section 214.¹¹

The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the government that is now in place is illegitimate, and what will be the consequences.

Moving forward from the coup

The first, and this is what is generally being spoken about, is that this coup may be a good thing, and the means justifies the end. The rule of Robert Mugabe has ended, and we can look

⁹ RAU & MPOI (2017), *Risk Taking in 2017: Preliminary findings*. December 2017, MPOI & RAU (in press).

¹⁰ Alex Magaisa, *Big Saturday Read: Legal charade threatens new government*. November 25th 2017.

[<https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/11/25/Big-Saturday-Read-Legal-charade-threatens-new-government>]

¹¹ Alex Magaisa, *Big Saturday Read: Government must avoid legal missteps*, December 4th 2017.

[<https://www.bigsr.co.uk/single-post/2017/12/04/BSR-Government-must-avoid-legal-missteps>]

forward to good governance, sensible economic policies, an end to corruption, and perhaps the opening of the political space, adherence to human rights, the opening of the media and press space, and so on.

However, it is now clear that ZANU-PF will continue to govern until the next election. They have rejected all calls for inclusivity, and interpreted the incoherent support of the people as a mandate to do so, cushioned by the unwillingness of opposition political parties and other internal groups to challenge the assumption of power, and bolstered further by the unwillingness of the international community to call the coup a coup.

The consequence will be that elections will happen, and ZANU-PF will win this election (**because they always do**). Here there have been less-than-reassuring indications with the resignation of the Chair of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and the continuance in office of the Registrar-General, Tobaiwa Mudede. The latter's continuance reveals yet another contradiction: the Minister of Finance states that all civil servants will have to retire at 65, but another Minister states that we cannot discriminate against the elderly, and Mr Mudede is long past retirement age. We can only hope that this kind of policy incoherence, which was such a feature of the past years of Mugabe's rule, will not become a feature of the new regime.

The opposition parties seem too fragmented to offer a serious challenge (or expose the illegalities if these are present), and need rapidly to move beyond the rhetoric of alliance to the actuality of a real, policy-driven alliance and electoral pact. If not, then we can only hope that the dreams of the citizens on the streets two weeks ago will be met. We can hope that ZANU-PF is willing to reform internally and turn into a bona fide modern political party, as suggested by Emmerson Mnangagwa at the Extraordinary Congress.

In general, and using a medical metaphor, this scenario is like hoping that the patient will heal him or herself, and generally this is the position of being unable to offer any treatment at all. Prayer might help, but little active intervention.

The most serious implication is that, failing any challenge to the coup, the military will have a direct hold on the state, and in a way that has not been there so overtly before. It is almost impossible in the short-term to roll this back without massive internal and external pressure, which seems wholly lacking. Here it is worth reading Phillip Roessler's piece in the Independent, which is also available on NewZimbabwe.com.¹² This puts very succinctly the problem and why the AU (and SADC) are failing Zimbabwe. It also must be pointed out again that the lack of clarity by internal forces to call this a coup is allowing the externals to avoid this decision.

The impact on civil society

The first impact to consider is that, in the very short term, it is highly improbable that this election will be free or fair. When the military take charge of the state, this is exceedingly rarely the preliminary to establishing democratic rule.

Consider the conditions at present. The chair of ZEC has resigned, the Registrar-General will remain, "Command Agriculture" will be put in place, soldiers will be deployed to *help* with

¹² *How the African Union got it wrong on Zimbabwe*, Phillip Roessler, *NewZimbabwe*, 5 December 2017. [<http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-40518-How+African+Union+got+it+wrong+on+Zim/opinion.aspx>]

farming, and voting will be “polling-station specific”. The possibilities of the system seen in 2008 being in place seem very high,¹³ although it is unlikely that there will be much violence.

This will be backed up by some progress on the economy. The recent budget has received moderate critical approval, but it should be noted that over 50% of the expenditure is for only four ministries: the Office of the President, Defence, Home Affairs, and Education (*Primary and Secondary Education*). Ministries dealing with security get 27% of the budget, while Health gets just under 9%! Related to the election, it seems doubtful that there will be serious cuts in the number of soldiers or the police, and it is commonplace how critical their role has been during elections.

The key issue, post-election, will be whether the victory for ZANU-PF “cures” the coup. This seems to be the hope of all the externals: that an election that cannot be contested will allow all to accept the new regime. This will allow re-engagement, helped immeasurably by the disappearance of Robert Mugabe, and a modicum of state reform, together with the low-hanging fruits for economic reform, will enable everyone to get on with life. One very unhappy prospect will be the demolition of opposition political parties, and then will begin a lengthy process of re-organisation, probably taking a decade.

However, if this does not work, and the elections are unsatisfactory to both internal and external forces, then things could get very tricky. Failure to win approval for the elections will undoubtedly exacerbate the crisis, especially the economic crisis. Investors are unlikely to be excited by continued political conflict, and the international community, while being unwilling to call regime change a “coup”, are equally unwilling to change their position in the absence of the rule of law, observance of human rights and good governance. This seems to be the position that the US will adopt, irrespective of whether they are lobbied by opposition political parties and civil society. The *sine qua non* of good governance in modern politics is good elections, and even better electoral alternation. “Command” elections are unlikely to find international favour, and thus it can be predicted that the current crisis will continue. Furthermore, the predilection for the curative power of elections is also supplemented by the requirement for good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, as in, for example, Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement.¹⁴

This will place civil society in a very difficult position, and especially because the military will have a much stronger say in government than ever before. Here bear in mind the dramatic increase in the power of the military after the 2008 “coup”, and think a little about the power that the military has now. Regionally, the rhetoric about NGOs being agents of “regime change” has been growing strongly in the past few years, and it might be expected that this become more pronounced should ZANU-PF find itself still embattled on the international front. This, of course, will be selective as in the past, with human rights groups and other civic groups dealing with governance being the primary targets. And, of course, this a sector deeply weakened already by the funding crisis of the past three years.

There are signs of this even now. Minister Chinamasa’s comments about the impossibility of devolution are not merely about costs, but more seriously about the intention to maintain

¹³ Sokwanele (2010), *the Anatomy of Terror*.

[http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/sokwanele_anatomy_of_terror_110612.pdf]

¹⁴ RAU (2015), *Zimbabwe, the European Union, and the Cotonou Agreement: An Opinion*. January 2015, Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2006), *Zimbabwe’s Failure to meet the Benchmarks in the Cotonou Agreement*, November 2006, Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.

strong centralised power. This is so evident from the complete lack of movement towards devolution in the past four years, and the continuance of the Provincial Ministers.

However, there will remain one pressing problem that the government, whether it wins approval through an acceptable election or not, will find very difficult to resolve. Nearly 70% of the population is under the age of 35, and this will continue to grow. Virtually all are unemployed, and it is hard to see how the dissatisfaction of the youth can be easily met. This is the powder keg for the future, as considerable evidence around the world demonstrates.¹⁵

In the short-term, the prognosis is not entirely grim, and there are steps that can be taken to deal with the current crisis.

- Challenge the coup – call it a coup, go to court to challenge Chiweshe’s judgements, and demand the removal of the soldiers from civilian life (there are no grounds for martial law). Although the government and the military claim Operation Restore Legacy is over, there are still reports of soldiers behaving in illegal fashion;¹⁶
- Demand an inclusive national dialogue on the way forward. This has been the call already from many civic groups and churches, and seems to be a view that may have some resonance within both SADC and the AU. It certainly provides a way to resolve the problems of the coup;
- Demand a transitional arrangement as an outcome of the national dialogue. As far as we have been able to establish, this might have been the preferred solution for SADC (but pre-empted by Mugabe’s resignation). Such a suggestion has been proposed as a solution for the crisis that would be inevitably precipitated by the contradictions within the regime for more than 18 months¹⁷.

Conclusions

For the second time in 50 years this country has been precipitated into a major constitutional and international crisis. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 caused a major international problem, and resulted in a very bloody civil war. Even though there was a strong international response to UDI, it can also be argued that the failure of the colonial power to immediately crush the rebellion was a very weak response to the constitutional crisis at that time. It was easy for the international community to repudiate UDI as the action was purely in support of 250,000 white settlers and against the interests of the vast majority of the population, virtually all of whom could not be citizens in any meaningful consideration of the term.

The second time, this coup has not produced a similar response by the international community, and the difference would seem the absence of internal repudiation of the coup. The lack of response seems to be predicated on the basis that if the coup is good enough for Zimbabweans then it is good enough for us. It is doubtful that any international government denies that there has been a coup, but they will be reluctant to say so if there is no internal

¹⁵ See Urdal, H. (2006). *A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence*. International Studies Quarterly. Volume 50, Issue 3, 607–629. [http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/egm-adolescents/p10_urdal.pdf]

¹⁶ For example, the incident where a soldier believes that he has powers of arrest and arrests a civilian for a perfectly acceptable inquiry. See ZLHR HRD Alerts, *ZIM AUTHORITIES ARREST MAN FOLLOWING ALTERCATION WITH ARMY OFFICER*. 19 December 2017.

¹⁷ Platform for Concerned Citizens, *Towards a National Transitional Authority (NTA)*. 16 November 2017.

disapproval. However, it is very hard to accept that a coup did not take place: even harder when the military remain in civilian life, the constitution continues to be violated, and there is little meaningful engagement between the “government” and the international community.

While everyone sits and watches, Zimbabwe moves into an uneasy stasis, where the “government” makes policy, passes budgets to implement the policies, and prepares for an election. Perhaps it is just the short time left before elections must take place that produces the inertia around condemnation, and the rather pious hope that elections can cure coups and not adherence to a constitution. Here we seem to have moved backwards in Africa, as Phillip Roessler points out. The old model for regime change, military takeover followed by elections for a civilian government, was supposed to be a thing of the past: Zimbabwe has just re-invented a new way to go back to the old model. It seems like a case of old wine in new bottles!

22nd December 2017

Appendix 1

Relevant Sections of the Constitution related to deployment of the security forces

110 Executive functions of President and Cabinet

(1) The President has the powers conferred by this Constitution and by any Act of Parliament or other law, including those necessary to exercise the functions of Head of State.

(2) Subject to this Constitution, the President is responsible for—

(g) deploying the Defence Forces;

113 States of public emergency

(1) The President may by proclamation in the *Gazette* declare that a state of public emergency exists in the whole or any part of Zimbabwe.

(2) A declaration of a state of public emergency ceases to have effect after fourteen days beginning with the day of publication of the proclamation in the *Gazette* unless, before the end of that period, the declaration is approved by at least two-thirds of the total membership of Parliament at a joint sitting of the Senate and the National Assembly.

(3) If Parliament is dissolved during the period of fourteen days after a state of public emergency has been declared, the declaration ceases to have effect after twenty-one days, beginning with the day of publication of the proclamation in the *Gazette*, unless within that period the declaration is approved by a majority of all the Members of the new Parliament at a joint sitting of the Senate and the National Assembly.

(4) A declaration of a state of public emergency which has been approved under subsection (2) or (3) remains in effect for three months from the date on which the proclamation was published in the *Gazette* unless it has earlier been revoked or ceased to have effect under this section.

(5) If a declaration of a state of public emergency is not approved after consideration by Parliament, or if for any reason it is not considered by Parliament within the period specified in this section, the President must, within seven days, by proclamation in the *Gazette*, revoke the declaration.

(6) If, by a resolution passed by a majority of the members present at a joint sitting of the Senate and the National Assembly, Parliament resolves that a declaration of a state of public emergency—

(a) should be continued for a further period not exceeding three months, the President must without delay, by proclamation in the *Gazette*, extend the declaration for that further period;

(b) should be revoked or that it should apply within a smaller area, the President must without delay, by proclamation in the *Gazette*, revoke the declaration or provide that the declaration relates to that smaller area.

(7) The Constitutional Court, on the application of any interested person, may determine the validity of—

(a) a declaration of a state of public emergency;

(b) any extension of a declaration of a state of public emergency.

(8) Any court may determine the validity of any legislation enacted, or other action taken, in consequence of a declaration of a state of public emergency.

208 Conduct of members of security services

(1) Members of the security services must act in accordance with this Constitution and the law.

(2) Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions—

- (a) act in a partisan manner;
- (b) further the interests of any political party or cause;
- (c) prejudice the lawful interests of any political party or cause; or
- (d) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.

(3) Members of the security services must not be active members or office-bearers of any political party or organisation.

(4) Serving members of the security services must not be employed or engaged in civilian institutions except in periods of public emergency.

212 Function of Defence Forces

The function of the Defence Forces is to protect Zimbabwe, its people, its national security and interests and its territorial integrity and to uphold this Constitution.

213 Deployment of Defence Forces

(1) Subject to this Constitution, only the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, has power—

- (a) to authorise the deployment of the Defence Forces; or
- (b) has power to determine the operational use of the Defence Forces.

(2) With the authority of the President, the Defence Forces may be deployed in Zimbabwe—

- (a) in defence of Zimbabwe;
- (b) in support of the Police Service in the maintenance of public order; or
- (c) in support of the Police Service and other civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster.

(3) With the authority of the President, the Defence Forces may be deployed outside Zimbabwe—

- (a) on peace-keeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation or any other international or regional organisation of which Zimbabwe is a member;
- (b) to defend the territorial integrity of a foreign country;
- (c) in fulfilment of an international commitment; or
- (d) in defence of Zimbabwe's national security or national interests.

(4) By a two-thirds majority of the total membership of Parliament at a joint sitting of the Senate and the National Assembly, Parliament may resolve that a deployment of the Defence Forces outside Zimbabwe should be rescinded.

(5) Where Parliament has resolved that a deployment of the Defence Forces outside Zimbabwe should be rescinded, the President must take all practical steps to withdraw the Defence Forces, taking due account of the need to ensure the safety of Zimbabwean personnel and equipment.

214 Political accountability for deployment of Defence Forces

When the Defence Forces are deployed—

- (a) in Zimbabwe to assist in the maintenance of public order; or
- (b) outside Zimbabwe;

the President must cause Parliament to be informed, promptly and in appropriate detail, of the reasons for their deployment and—

- (i) where they are deployed in Zimbabwe, the place where they are deployed;
- (ii) where they are deployed outside Zimbabwe, the country in which they are deployed.

