APRÈS MOI LE DÉLUGE: SUCCESSION AND THE ZANU PF PARTY CONSTITUTION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The somewhat provocative title of this report conceals an extremely serious issue with Zimbabwean politics. The theme of succession, both of the State Presidency and the leadership of ZANU PF, increasingly bedevils all matters relating to the political stability of Zimbabwe and any form of transition to democracy.

The constitutional issues related to the death (or infirmity) of the President have been dealt with in several reports by RAU. In these reports it was noted that there are arguably two valid interpretations of the provisions in the State Constitution in this regard - one is that a nominee “of” ZANU PF is simply appointed as the successor to President Mugabe, the other is that both Houses of Parliament sit together as an Electoral College and elect a nominee “of” ZANU PF as successor. But providing that the nominee is “of” ZANU PF rather than rather than “by or from” ZANU PF opens the door to several possibilities as to the nature of the nominee, including that the nominee may be “of” ZANU PF but not a member of that party. The various possibilities and the difficulty they will present the Clerk of Parliament (who effectively plays the role of a nomination court) are discussed in the paper.

However, if ZANU PF is to select the nominee in terms of its own constitution, further problems need to be considered. The ZANU PF Constitution is not well-known and only recently has a copy of the full, detailed Constitution been available for independent analysis. Using this copy, the structure of ZANU PF is outlined in the paper, together with the powers, duties, and responsibilities of every structure within the Party. Of particular importance are the powers related to elections and amendment of the Party Constitution. It is evident that there are a number of grey areas in respect of election to the office of any of the four posts in the ZANU PF Presidium, including the post of President and First Secretary. The clarity of the procedures leaves much to be desired and is a fertile area for dispute.

With an understanding of the applicable provisions, rules, and the powers of the various structures within ZANU PF, the question of election to the Presidium is analysed, and the important role of the Provincial Coordinating Committees [PCCs] is described. The ZANU PF Constitution stipulates that any candidate receiving nomination by six or more of the ten Provinces will be directly “elected” to the Presidium, by the National People’s Congress. It is unclear what happens if the Congress refuses to “elect” the nominee chosen by the PCCs. It is also unclear what happens in the event of multiple nominations and splits between the PCCs.

More topically, the role of the DCCs (District Co-ordinating Committees) is outlined, with the understanding that the Chairs of the various DDCs comprise(d) part of PCCs. Hence, the dissolution of the DCCs has implications for the electoral process for the Presidium, since, without the DCC chairmen represented on the PCC, any decision could run the risk of being legally challenged on the basis of that the body is improperly constituted. This can have knock-on effect. Improperly constituted PCCs cannot make legal decisions, including nominating persons for election to the Presidium.

The difficulties (and the above is one example) become amplified in the situation where the ZANU PF constitutional and electoral machinery must conclude its processes within the 90 day or shorter time frame required by State Constitution for voting in a Parliamentary Electoral College following the death or infirmity of the President. It seems that this would create a well-nigh impossible deadline for the internal ZANU PF procedures.
Although the national succession problem has yet to occur, there have been problems of succession within ZANU PF over the years, and these are analysed with respect to the ZANU PF Constitution, especially the events related to deaths of previous members of the Presidium – that of Joshua Nkomo in 1999, Simon Muzenda in 2003, and Joseph Msika in 2009. The manner in which the replacements to posts in the Presidium were made is considered as a possible indicator as to what might happen when the next vacancy in arises. As the report shows, each of these deaths lead to considerable internal conflict over succession, and, following the death of Simon Muzenda, to the remarkable events of the “Tsholotsho Declaration” in 2004. The consequence of all of these events has led to an increased centralisation of power in the hands of the Politburo, and the marginalisation of the democratic core of the ZANU PF Constitution.

The paper shows that nominations to the ZANU PF Presidium have, to date, been determined, in the face of considerable resistance, by a process of “guided democracy” on instructions issued by a Politburo controlled by Mugabe. The question thus arises as to what will happen when the post to be filled is that of the “guide” - Mugabe himself. Several scenarios suggest themselves, and are considered at the conclusion of the paper.

The first is that the democratic processes set out in the ZANU PF constitution, and sidelined by Mugabe, will be reinvigorated and activated. However, as noted above, these very processes have been altered significantly by Mugabe, who facilitated the constitutional amendment to change the Provincial Electoral Colleges from the 44 member Provincial Executive Committee to the 100 plus Provincial Coordinating Committees. Since these later committees are made up of several other elective bodies, those structures will need to be in place before a PCC can be said to be properly convened.1 The costs and logistical difficulties of bringing such a large number of delegates together on short notice, and the legal complexities around the disbandment of the DCCs, may well present grounds for procedural objections, already, as noted, a weak spot of this electoral process.2 Following nominations, the elaborate process of endorsement by the National People’s Conference and “election” by Congress may need to take place. All will need to be completed within the timeframe for the Parliamentary Electoral College established by the State Constitution.

In view of these difficulties, a second scenario may arise where the Central Committee exercises its power to amend the ZANU PF Constitution and establishes an expedited method of nomination. Thirdly, the Politburo may continue to arrogate to itself powers it does not have, as it has done under Mugabe, and direct the nomination procedure. In these latter two instances, none of these bodies is likely to speak with one voice and the process may be susceptible to legal challenge or, worse, extra juridical conflict.

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1 These issues have already been raised as difficulties in the nomination process – see for example Battle For ZANU PF Top Posts Hots Up The Herald 16.11.09.
2 Recently, electoral procedures within both the MDC-M/N splinter opposition party and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions have been challenged on this basis leading to fracturing of the groups.
Introduction.

“You can have any color as long as it’s black.” - Henry Ford

Zimbabwean President, Robert Mugabe, will turn 89 in February 2013. Although Party officials insist that he is “as fit as a fiddle”, it is unlikely that he is immune from the health problems which accompany any person approaching 90. Frequent, and often seemingly urgent, trips to Singapore for specialised medical treatment in 2011 and 2012 suggest that Mugabe’s current spell of good health is precarious at best. Two articles have recently been written outlining some of the legal and political implications which might arise if Mugabe were to suddenly “depart the stage”, or become too ill to perform his duties.

The crux of those articles is that there are two provisions in Zimbabwe’s Constitution which require consideration in the event of Mugabe’s demise. Firstly, section 28(3)(b) of the main body of the State Constitution stipulates that, on the President’s death or resignation, both Houses of Parliament, the Houses of Assembly and Senate, will sit as an electoral college within 90 days to select a successor for the remainder of the presidential term. Secondly, a Schedule to the Constitution (Schedule 8) which gives effect to an inter-party political agreement (“the GPA”) to form an inclusive government provides in Article 20.1.10:

In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 [the executive] and 20.1.9 above, [presidential appointments to the Senate] such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that position prior to the vacancy arising.

Accordingly, in the event of Mugabe’s death, the vacancy in the highest post in the executive must be filled by a nominee of ZANU PF. However, it is unclear whether Article 20.1.10 of Schedule 8 operates in tandem with the provisions of section 28(3)(b) or overrides those provisions. If it overrides the provisions, the nominee of ZANU PF will declared by the Clerk of Parliament to be duly elected as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and will be sworn in as President by the Chief Justice without any further ado. However, while the provisions of Schedule 8 override all provisions in the main body of the Constitution “to the contrary”, Article 20.1.10 is not necessarily contrary to the section establishing the Electoral College. Reading the two as operative conjunctively is open to some debate. Schedule 8 to the Constitution also provides that not only that Zimbabwe’s executive shall include the posts of President and Prime Minister, but, most unusually, also that these posts shall be occupied by specific individuals – Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai respectively. It is thus arguable that Article 20.1.10 was not intended to apply to these provisions. It could be contended that in the event of Mugabe’s death, the constitutional provisions pertaining to the inclusive government cannot be fulfilled and the GPA must end. I am indebted to Dr. Lovemore Madhuku for this point.

\(^{3}\) Remark about the Model T in 1909, published in his autobiography My Life and Work (1922) Chapter IV, p. 71 (source wikipedia).


\(^{5}\) The time of writing is July 2012.

\(^{6}\) Drop Dead Beautiful and Thinking Inside the Box available at http://www.researchandadvocacyunit.org.

\(^{7}\) The euphemism is that favoured by the former US Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Christopher Dell – see Wikileaks cable 04Harare1914.

\(^{8}\) The correct legal term for the agreement between the parties is the Interparty Political Agreement but has become popularly known as the “Global Political Agreement”.

\(^{9}\) The Schedule is intended to be temporary and lasts only for so long as the GPA is in existence.

\(^{10}\) This is open to some debate. Schedule 8 to the Constitution also provides that not only that Zimbabwe’s executive shall include the posts of President and Prime Minister, but, most unusually, also that these posts shall be occupied by specific individuals – Mugabe and Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai respectively. It is thus arguable that Article 20.1.10 was not intended to apply to these provisions. It could be contended that in the event of Mugabe’s death, the constitutional provisions pertaining to the inclusive government cannot be fulfilled and the GPA must end. I am indebted to Dr. Lovemore Madhuku for this point.

\(^{11}\) Paragraph 4(1) of the 5th Schedule of the Electoral Act.

\(^{12}\) Section 28(5) of the National Constitution.
entirely possible, and merely requires that the Electoral College may only choose between candidates who are “of” ZANU PF.

The previous papers considering this issue, referred to above, did not address the question of how the nominee “of” ZANU PF is to be determined, but merely suggested the process might be messy. This paper delves into the quagmire, drawing upon provisions in the ZANU PF Party Constitution.

The Nominee “of” ZANU PF

The manner in which the nominee “of” ZANU PF is determined will depend upon whether an electoral college is to sit – in which event the provisions of the ZANU PF Party Constitution will interface with the State Constitution – or whether the nominee determined by ZANU PF as a party will simply be sworn into office – in which event the provisions of the ZANU PF Party Constitution and the extent to which it is, or is not, applied will assume primary importance.

a) An Electoral College

The process of determining the candidates in the event that an electoral college is convened is complicated by the poor drafting of Article 20.1.10.13 The phrase “shall be filled by a nominee of the Party” is infelicitous. The use of the preposition “of” renders the intention unclear. Is the phrase to mean that the nomination must be made “by” the party which held the position? – which would then mean that the nominee could, in theory at least, be a member of the MDC. Or is the phrase to mean that the nominee must be “from” (i.e. belong to) the party which held the position? – which would then mean that the nomination need not be by ZANU PF as a party but that any person or entity (including the MDC) could suggest a ZANU PF nominee for the post.

The procedure for an election under the Electoral College is set out in the 5th Schedule to the Electoral Act.14 Paragraph 3 thereof makes it clear that a nomination may be made by any 25 Members of Parliament signing and submitting a duly completed nomination form to the Clerk of Parliament.15 The Clerk is duty bound to accept nominations which meet all other requirements set out in paragraph 3(1) of the 5th Schedule. These requirements are that the candidate: (a) is a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth or by descent; (b) has attained the age of forty years; and (c) is ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe. The nomination form must be countersigned with the acceptance of the candidate.16 During the duration of the GPA, to these stipulations must now be added the requirement that the candidate is “of” ZANU PF.

The Clerk of Parliament thus will have the tricky task of determining what is meant by the phrase “of the party”. This issue could become extremely troubled and complex.

Where there is only one nominee, he or she must be declared by the Clerk of Parliament, presently Austin Zvoma,17 to be duly elected as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe without the necessity of

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13 As noted elsewhere, the drafting of the GPA, Article 20 of which is repeated verbatim in the Constitution, leaves much to be desired and is technically inept – see Matyszak. D. Law, Politics and Zimbabwe “Unity” Government KAS and RAU 2010 Chapter 6. (Matyszak 2009).
14 Chapter 02:13.
15 The nomination form (Appendix 2) reads as follows: “We, the Senators and members of the House of Assembly whose names and signatures appear on the reverse of this form, hereby nominate….”
16 Paragraph 3(2)(b) of 5th Schedule of the Electoral Act.
17 Zvoma’s position as Clerk is being challenged in legal proceedings currently working their way through the courts. For details on this case see http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/120327veritas.asp?sector= DEMGG&year=0&range_start=1
a tally of votes. ZANU PF may thus seek to ensure that only one candidate is put forward on behalf of the Party. However, even if this were to happen, the ambiguous wording of Article 20.1.10 does not guarantee that the post will not be contested. Three other scenarios may arise where there is no unanimity within ZANU PF for the nominee: 25 ZANU PF MPs may defy the Party and submit their own nomination of a fellow member of ZANU PF; or a member of ZANU PF might be nominated by MDC MPs, or a combination of MDC and ZANU PF MPs; or a compromise candidate who is not from ZANU PF might be the nominee of 25 ZANU PF MPs. The Clerk of Parliament would have to determine, in all instances, whether the candidate so nominated is “of” ZANU PF. Where any nomination paper is rejected by the Clerk of Parliament on the basis that the candidate is not “of” ZANU PF, his decision may be subject to review by the Supreme Court at the instance of the rejected nominee.

The situation may be further complicated by the fact that any person defying an attempt by ZANU PF as a party to ensure that only one candidate is proposed might be expelled from the Party as a result. The candidate could then be considered to be no longer “of” ZANU PF, thus breaching the constitutional requirement of Schedule 8 of the Constitution. The issue would be even more complex if the expulsion took place after the Clerk had already accepted the candidate’s nomination papers, and, in all likelihood, in consequence thereof.

Only the National Disciplinary Committee of the Central Committee has the power to expel a member from the Party. This Committee comprises the National Chairman and four other members of the Central Committee appointed by the “Presidency”. It is unclear whether the Committee is appointed on an ad hoc basis for each case to be determined, or whether it is a standing committee, appointed after the selection of the Central Committee. In any event, if the National Disciplinary Committee must be appointed in the absence of the President, one of the Vice Presidents will deputise for this purpose.

It should also be noted here that the Clerk of the Parliament also has the discretion to determine exactly when, within the 90 day period, the election will be held. This discretion is only constrained by the requirement that nominations must be called for 14 days prior to the election. The Clerk thus has the power to set the election date within 14 days of the President’s demise, giving ZANU PF little time to determine its candidate.

b) A Summary Appointment.

If the ZANU PF nominee is to be summarily appointed to the presidency without the sitting of an electoral college, or if ZANU PF as a party determines that only one candidate shall be presented in terms of the procedures governing an electoral college, then the ZANU PF Constitution ought to hold sway and determine the issue. The ZANU PF Constitution is an inordinately complex document and, in places, poorly drafted. These two factors render the choice of the ZANU PF nominee far from straightforward, as will be apparent from what follows.

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18 Schedule 5 paragraph 4(1) of the Electoral Act.
19 Schedule 5 paragraph 3(7)(b) of the Electoral Act.
20 Section 77 of the ZANU PF Constitution.
21 The use of the word “presidency” meaning “the office of the president” leaves it uncertain whether the intention is that the appointments are made by the President or Presidium.
22 See below.
23 Section 43(1) of the ZANU PF Constitution. Which of the two is not specified. Thus it would be difficult to resolve a situation where each of the two Vice Presidents were contenders for the post of president, and one were nominated to the Parliament against the wishes of the Party.
24 Schedule 5 Paragraph 2(1) of the Electoral Act.
25 An issue considered further below.
The ZANU PF Constitution does not contain a direct statement that the Party President must be the Party candidate for the office of State President. Although usual, it is not always the case that the head of a political party is always the candidate in State elections. Term limits for the office of State President may render this impossible.\textsuperscript{26} The ZANU PF Constitution addresses the matter obliquely with a requirement that ZANU PF’s yearly National Peoples’ Conference\textsuperscript{27} declare the President of the Party as the State Presidential candidate of the Party.\textsuperscript{28} The use of the word “declare” suggests that this is the merely formal announcement or public revelation of a pre-existing condition which arises from some other provision of ZANU PF’s Constitution. There is, however, no such other provision. It is thus necessary to infer that the ZANU PF Party President is the Party candidate for State President. This crucial point is by no means certain, and the further question may arise as to whether this position pertains in the absence of the declaration by the National People’s Conference. The National People’s Conference could, however, convene in special session for this purpose.\textsuperscript{29} However, the lack of clarity in this regard would come to the fore if the National People’s Conference were to refuse to make the declaration as required.

If the person appointed as President of ZANU PF is automatically the ZANU PF candidate for the office of State President, the ZANU PF nominee for purposes of summary appointment under Article 20.1.10 of the State Constitution would be determined by the procedures governing the election of the new Party President. In order to understand the process by which the ZANU PF Party President is elected, it is necessary to examine the somewhat byzantine party structure of ZANU PF. Few have attempted to do so, probably because, until recently,\textsuperscript{30} the ZANU PF Constitution has not been readily available. The ZANU PF Party website sets out a version of its Constitution, simplified to the point of inaccuracy, and, oddly, does not make the entire constitution available on the site.\textsuperscript{31}

The Structure of ZANU PF

There are three main components of ZANU PF – the “Main Wing”, the Women’s League, and the Youth League. Each is structured in almost exactly the same way containing the elective building blocks of the Party, administrative and coordinating bodies, and consultative fora. The structure of the Main Wing is set out below.

a) Elected Bodies\textsuperscript{32}

The basic unit of ZANU PF is “the Cell” (urban areas) or Village (rural areas).\textsuperscript{33} Ten of the seven member cell or village committees constitute a “Branch”,\textsuperscript{34} thus constituting some 70 members. The Branches are grouped into “Districts” under a District Executive Committee. There may be up to 80 such Districts in each Province of Zimbabwe. These “Districts” should not be confused with the 60 Districts formed in terms of the Rural District Councils Act\textsuperscript{35}, referred to in ZANU PF’s Constitution as “Administrative Districts.”

\textsuperscript{26} Thabo Mbeki, for example, was mooted for a third term as president of the ANC Party, even though he would have been ineligible for a third term as South African State President.

\textsuperscript{27} See below.

\textsuperscript{28} Section 30(3) of the ZANU PF Constitution. The fact that this is merely a formality is sometimes overlooked by sections of the press see Frail Mugabe Hangs on as Zanu PF Candidate Daily News 30.11.11.

\textsuperscript{29} Section 31(1) of the ZANU PF Constitution.

\textsuperscript{30} It has recently been posted on kubatana.net.

\textsuperscript{31} The activist group Sokwanele has however, set out the Party structure of ZANU PF and has made a useful flow chart available, included here as Annexure D.

\textsuperscript{32} At least one third of all the bodies mentioned under this head must comprise women.

\textsuperscript{33} The size of each cell is determined by the Central Committee – section 137 of the ZANU PF Constitution.

\textsuperscript{34} Section 136 of the ZANU PF Constitution.

\textsuperscript{35} Section 6 of the Act [Chapter 29:13].
The composition of the Cell or Village Committee is different from that of the other elected bodies. The Committee is elected by the Cell or Village every year, and is composed of only a Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, Political Commissar, Secretary for Security, and two other Committee members. The number of times each Cell or Village convenes in each year is not stated.

The Branch, District, and Provincial Executive Committees are elected and structured in a similar fashion to each other. The Central Committee will determine the number of delegates from the next lowest tier to a Branch, District, or Provincial Conference convened for the purpose of electing the executive committee of each. The ability of the Central Committee to determine the delegates who will elect the respective Executives Committees adulterates the democratic nature of the process and allows for the possibility of manipulation by the Central Committee. The outcome could be determined by carefully selecting delegates. Suspicions of this kind of manipulation appear to have emerged in the fiercely contested election for the Chairman of the Provincial Electoral Committee of Mashonaland West. Following strenuous objections from a faction within the Province, the Central Committee was compelled to allow delegates from all 271 Party Districts in the Province to vote. The Central Committee also directed that the DCCs (see below) and District Executive Council members of both the Youth and Women’s League be permitted to vote, in total some 4,449 people.

The Executive Committee is elected every two years in the case of a Branch, every three years in the case of a District, and every four years in the case of the Province. At these specially convened electoral conferences, the delegates will appoint 15 members of a 44-member executive comprising:

i) The Chairman (sic);
ii) The Vice Chairman;
iii) The Secretary for Administration;
iv) The Secretary for Finance;
v) The Secretary for Commissariat;
vi) The Secretary for Security;
vii) The Secretary for Transport and Social welfare;
viii) The Secretary for Information and Publicity;
ix) The Secretary for Legal Affairs;
x) The Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
xii) The Secretary for Production and Labour;
xii) The Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
xiii) The Secretary for Economic Affairs;
xiv) The Secretary for Education;
xv) The Secretary for Gender and Culture;
xvi) The Secretary for Welfare of the Disabled and the Disadvantaged persons;
xvii) The Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement
Vice-secretaries are appointed for each of the secretarial positions. The remaining twelve non-
portfolio positions are occupied by two other elected committee members, and, \textit{ex officio}, the
Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Secretary for Finance and Secretary for Commissariat of the
relevant area (Branch, District or Province) of both the Women’s and Youth Leagues. Each of these
Executive Committees is required to meet monthly.

The function of the first three elected structures, (the Cell, Branch, and District) is not stated, but
presumably each is intended to further the objectives of the Party.\footnote{Set out in Article 2 of the ZANU PF Constitution.} The function of the Provincial
Executive Council is specifically prescribed as being the implementation of the Party decisions,
directives, rules and regulations, and the organisation of public meetings and provincial rallies of the
Party.\footnote{Section 95(1) of the ZANU PF Constitution.}

b) Administrative and Coordinating Bodies

In addition to the elected components, a hierarchy of three bodies exists with administrative and
coordinating functions. These bodies comprise partly elected and partly \textit{ex officio} members, who may
themselves be drawn from elected bodies. The \textit{ex officio} groupings often constitute a substantial
portion of the membership of each.

The Districts referred to above were clustered according to the Administrative District into which
they fell and operated under the aegis of District Coordinating Committees (DCC), which was the
lowest tier of the administrative and coordinating bodies.

Immediately after the first draft of this paper was completed, ZANU PF announced that the Central
Committee had disbanded the DCCs.\footnote{ZANU PF DCCs Disbanded The Herald 30.06.12.} However, as amendments to the ZANU PF Constitution by
the Central Committee are “subject to ratification by Congress”\footnote{Section 34(8) of the ZANU PF Constitution.}, this body continues to exists \textit{de jure}
until such ratification.\footnote{ZANU PF is most likely to disregard the implications of the requirement for ratification and to proceed as if the
disbandment has already been effected – see below.} The DCCs form part of the Congress and it will be interesting to see if ZANU
PF excludes their members prior to ratification. The DCCs remain included here so that the effect of
their dissolution may be noted.

The DCCs were intended to co-ordinate the activities of all the Party Districts in the Administrative
District under their purview. There are currently 60 rural Administrative Districts and 29 urban.\footnote{The number of districts appears in the Delimitation Report for the 2008 Elections.} Thus, in terms of the ZANU PF Constitution, there should have been 89 DCCs. Each DCC was
“elected by such number of delegates, as may be determined by the Central Committee from time to time, from the Party
Districts in each Administrative District at a Conference called for that purpose.”\footnote{Section 116.} The election ought to have
taken place every three years. However, a large component of the DCC comprised members who held
office \textit{ex officio}. Only 13 members are elected. The remainder of each DCC comprised:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[i)] All members of the Central Committee (see below) from that Administrative
          District;
  \item[ii)] All members of the National Consultative Assembly (see below) from that
          Administrative District;
\end{itemize}
iii) All members of the Province\(^{47}\) from that Administrative District;
iv) All Party Members of Parliament from that Administrative District;
v) The Chairperson of the War Veterans Association in that Administrative District;
i) The Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Ex-Political Prisoners and Restrictees Association in that Administrative District;
vi) The Chairperson of the War Collaborators Association in that Administrative District.

There is also a Provincial Coordinating Committee (PCC) for each Province. It is headed by the chairperson of the Provincial Executive Council, described as the Chairman of the Province, and meets at least once every three months.\(^{48}\)

The PCC is an extremely important body, as will be seen, and comprises:

1. The Provincial Executive Council;
2. Members of the Central Committee in the Province;
3. Members of the National Consultative Assembly (see below) in the Province;
4. The Provincial Executive Committee of the Women’s League;
5. The Provincial Executive Committee of the Youth League;
6. Party Members of Parliament from the Province; and
7. (The Chairpersons of District Coordinating Committees from the Province)

The function of the PCC is to act as the Elections Directorate of the Province, to monitor and recommend any political or development programmes and initiatives in the Province, and to foster an integrated approach to provincial issues between Party, Government, and non-governmental organisations.\(^{49}\) Most importantly, the PCCs effectively elect (see below) the ZANU PF Presidium, which heads the Central Committee.

The Central Committee is the principal organ of the National People’s Congress (see below), a body described in the ZANU PF Constitution as “the supreme policy-making organ of the Party”.\(^{50}\) Since the Congress only convenes once every five years in regular session, and the Central Committee performs its policy making powers when it is not in session, it is an extremely important component of the ZANU PF structure. The Party Constitution states that the Central Committee has 245 members, but the sum of the members of the Central Committee then listed amounts to only 240 members. These members are as follows:

1. the President and First Secretary;
2. 2 Vice Presidents and Second Secretaries one of whom shall be a woman;
3. The National Chairman of the Party.
4. 130 members nominated by the PCCs on a pro rata basis according to the national census figures of each province and in such a manner that each Administrative District has at least one member appointed to the Central Committee.

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\(^{47}\) This presumably means those members of the Provincial Coordinating Committee (see below) not otherwise specifically mentioned (as, for example, are Central Committee members) and would thus mean Administrative District members of the Provincial Executive Council and the Provincial Executive Members of the Women’s and Youth Leagues.

\(^{48}\) Section 83(1) of the ZANU PF Constitution.

\(^{49}\) Section 83(2) of the ZANU PF Constitution.

\(^{50}\) Section 21(1) of the ZANU PF Constitution.
v) the Secretary for Women's Affairs;
vi) the Secretary for Youth Affairs;
vii) 34 members representing the Women's and Youth Leagues nominated by the Leagues at the National Women's and Youth Conferences (see below);
viii) 10 members nominated by the Presidency “on account of their outstanding contribution to either the armed liberation struggle of the country and/or its development after Independence”;
ix) 10 Chairpersons of the Provinces who shall be ex-officio members;
x) 50 members who shall be women allocated to the Provinces in such a way and manner that each Province shall have five members. It is not stated by whom such allocation is made, but this is probably by the PCC.  

The function of the Central Committee is described as being to:

i) make rules, regulations and procedures to govern the conduct of the Party and its members;
ii) implement all policies, resolutions, directives, decisions and programmes enunciated by Congress including to give directions, supervise and superintend all the functions of the Central Government in relation to these programmes;
iii) set up Party organs, committees, institutions, commissions and enterprises in the name and on behalf of the Party;
iv) convene Congress in ordinary and/or extraordinary session and formulate the agenda, procedures and regulations for business of Congress;
v) amend the Constitution, if deemed necessary, subject to ratification by Congress.

During the sitting of Congress, the President appoints from the Central Committee 19 persons to head each of the Departments of Congress and 19 deputies to each. These executive posts roughly match the executive positions noted in respect of the elected and co-ordinating bodies, though several additional departments have been established. The intention seems to be to create positions which accord with governmental ministries and positions. They are as follows.

i) the President and First Secretary;
ii) two (2) Vice Presidents and Second Secretaries;
iii) the National Chairman;
iv) the Secretary for Administration;
v) the Secretary for Finance;
vi) the Secretary for Commissariat;
vii) the Secretary for External Relations;
viii) the Secretary for National Security;
ix) the Secretary for Transport and Social Welfare;
x) the Secretary for Information and Publicity;
xi) the Secretary for Legal Affairs;
xii) the Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
xiii) the Secretary for Production and Labour;
xiv) the Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
v) the Secretary for Economic Affairs;

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51 At least one third of the Central Committee must be women – Section 19(3).
52 The ZANU PF Constitution thus assumes that ZANU PF will be the ruling party. This clause cannot be implemented while executive power is partly held by the MDC under the current Inclusive Government.
xvi) the Secretary for Women’s Affairs;
xvii) the Secretary for Youth Affairs;
xviii) the Secretary for Education;
xix) the Secretary for Gender and Culture;
xx) the Secretary for Welfare of the Disabled and Disadvantaged Persons;
xxi) the Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement;
xxii) the Secretary for Science and Technology;
xxiii) 10 Committee Members;
xxiv) 19 Deputies to the Heads of Departments of the Politburo.

The persons occupying these positions, and 10 other members appointed at the same time by the President from the Central Committee, form the body known as the Politburo. In terms of the Party Constitution, there should thus be 53 members. In fact, some 58 persons (set out in Annexure A) are part of the Politburo currently appointed by Mugabe. The list of members as set out in the Party Constitution and reproduced above, is also stated to be the “rank” of members “in order of precedence”. The last in the order of precedence, the 19 Deputies, have no voting powers. The Politburo’s function is to act as the secretariat to the Central Committee. It is the administrative organ of the Central Committee, and implements all decisions, directives, rules, and regulations of the Central Committee. It meets at least once a month, or more often as directed by the President. With the Central Committee holding all the plenary powers of Congress, and with the Politburo comprising the persons charged with executing these powers, this is the most powerful body within ZANU PF.

c) Consultative Fora

In theory, the principal body of ZANU PF is the National People’s Congress. It is composed of:

i) all members of the Central Committee;
ii) all members of the National Consultative Assembly;
iii) all members of the Women's League;
iv) all members of the National Council of Youth League;
v) all members of the Provincial Coordinating Committees;
vi) (all members of the District Coordinating Committees);
   vii) the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary, Political Commissar and Treasurer, and
   two members each from the Women's and Youth League from every District
   Executive Council of the Party.

The powers of the Congress have already been described in relation to the Central Committee, which as stated, exercises most of the powers of the Congress when it is not in session. Although the Congress ordinarily convenes every five years, extraordinary sessions of Congress may be convoked at the instance of the majority of the members of the Central Committee, or by the President at the instance of not less than one third of members of the Central Committee, or following the resolution to do so of five Provincial Executive Councils. However, six weeks’ notice is required to convene such an extraordinary session of Congress. The procedure for the business of the Congress is determined by the Central Committee. Nominally, the Congress has elective powers, which will be considered further below.

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53 Section 36 of the ZANU PF Constitution.
54 This grouping is part of the Congress “unless otherwise directed by the Central Committee” – section 20(8).
55 Section 22 of the ZANU PF Constitution.
In addition to the Congress there are two other consultative bodies, the National People's Conference and National Consultative Assembly. The former is composed of:

i) All members of the Central Committee;
ii) All members of the National Consultative Assembly;
iii) All members of the National Council of the Women's League
iv) All members of the National Council of the Youth League;
v) All members of the Provincial Coordinating Committees;
vi) All members of the Provincial Councils;

vii) (All members of District Coordinating Committees); and
viii) All members of the District Executive Councils as may be determined by the Central Committee time to time;

The “People’s Conference” convenes yearly and the press often erroneously refers to its meeting as a ZANU PF “Congress”, though it is obviously important to distinguish between a Conference and a Congress. The purpose of these yearly conventions is somewhat vaguely defined and loosely interpreted. It is essentially to receive feedback from and to monitor the Central Committee on the implementation of the decisions and programmes determined by the Congress. It also considers reports submitted to it by the Central Committee. As stated, it is also required to “declare the President of the Party elected at Congress (see below) as the State Presidential Candidate of the Party”.

The last body to be considered under this head is the National Consultative Assembly, comprising:

i) All members of the Central Committee;
ii) All members of the National Assembly of the Women's League and their Deputies;
iii) All members of the National Assembly of the Youth League and the Deputies;
iv) All members of the ten Provincial Executive Councils;
v) Such other members designated by the Central Committee on account of their contribution to the liberation struggle or development of the country after Independence; and
vi) All former members of the Central Committee.

This body convenes twice yearly and is intended as a sounding board for the Central Committee. It debates issues of policy referred to it by the President or Central Committee, with a view to making appropriate recommendations to the Central Committee.

Elections for the Presidium under the ZANU PF Constitution

With the structure of ZANU PF set out, it is now possible to consider the electoral processes for the Presidium (President, Vice Presidents, and National Chairman) under the ZANU PF Constitution. The relevant clauses of the ZANU PF Constitution in this regard are poorly drafted, and, in places, the wording has possibly been deliberately chosen to obscure the true effect of these clauses. The kernel of the process appears in section 32, which provides that the Presidium:

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56Section 30 of the ZANU PF Constitution.
57 There is one further consultative body of lesser importance and not relevant for current purposes. Provincial Inter-District Conference which reviews Party projects in the province to discuss any other matters referred to it by the Central Committee. It comprises “the Joint Provincial Council” and such number of delegates from the Party Districts as determined by the Central Committee from time to time.
shall be elected by Congress directly upon nomination by at least six (6) Provincial Co-ordinating Committees of the Party, meeting separately in Special Session called for that purpose;

Provided that if in respect of any position being contested no candidate succeeds in securing the nomination by at least six (6) Provincial Co-ordinating Committees, the candidates having the highest nomination votes, shall be referred to the Provincial Co-ordinating Committees for fresh nomination. This process shall be repeated until it yields a candidate who commands the nomination by at least six (6) Provincial Co-ordinating Committees. The candidate, who through this process attains the nomination by at least six (6) Provincial Co-ordinating Committees, shall stand nominated for election directly by Congress…

For the avoidance of doubt, each Provincial Co-ordinating Committee shall act as the electoral college for the purpose of arriving at the nominations…

The yawning gap in these provisions is that the term of office of those “elected directly by Congress” is not explicitly stated. These provisions must be read with section 22 which establishes the Congress. Subsection 22(6) is as follows:

there shall be a Presidium consisting of the President and First Secretary, two Vice Presidents and Second Secretaries and the National Chairman, who shall preside over proceedings of Congress as directed by the President and First Secretary of the Party; provided that following a dissolution of the Central Committee immediately preceding the election of a new Central Committee in terms of Section 32 of this Constitution, the Presidium established under this section shall continue in office until the conclusion of the business of Congress.

Considering the importance of the issue, one would expect a clause setting out when, and under what circumstances the Central Committee is to be dissolved. It is only clear that the extant Central Committee is to be dissolved immediately prior to the election of a new Central Committee. There is nothing, however, to indicate that the election of a new Central Committee must take place every five years during each ordinary session of Congress.

Notwithstanding this lack of clarity relating to tenure, it is apparent that in terms of the procedure set out in section 32, each PCC convenes for the particular purpose of nominating a candidate to the Presidium. If a candidate receives the nomination of six of the PCCs, the nominee is then “directly elected” by the Congress. Where no candidate is nominated by six PCCs, the candidates with “the highest nomination votes” are referred back to the PCCs for fresh nomination. The practice is that the PCCs ensure that the Special Conferences for this purpose takes place prior to Congress.

This process raises several questions. Firstly, with several nominees, the split may render the interpretation to be accorded to those with the “highest nomination votes” problematic. Does the phrase refer to the votes of the Provinces or the votes of the delegates within the PCCs? In the former instance, if there are four nominees proposed with the support of 4, 3, 2 and 1 of the 10 provinces, is it the top three, or only the top two, that are referred back to the PCCs? What is the situation if the nominations split 4:2:2:2 - or 4:3:3 with three nominees? Which are the highest of these? Secondly, what is the meaning to be accorded to the notion that the candidate securing the nomination of six provinces is elected directly by the Congress. The term “election” suggests that Congress has a choice. If there is only one nominee for “election” put forward, as the process provides, what is the choice given to Congress? Congress essentially endorses or ratifies the choice made by the PCCs rather than elects the candidate. Yet the Constitution is silent as to what is to happen if Congress refuses to make

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58 This is often suggested as a possibility in press reports although it is not specifically provided for by the Party Constitution.
the endorsement or ratify the candidate. The Congress is often referred to by ZANU PF officials “as elective.” Does the Congress thus have the power to suggest an entirely different candidate for election “from the floor” who has not, as the Constitution seems to require, been nominated by the PCCs?

The ZANU PF Constitution contains no special provisions to deal with the contingency of its President’s sudden demise. The only clause of relevance is section 43(1) which stipulates that one of the Vice Presidents will “deputise and exercise any or all of the functions of the President and First Secretary in his absence or at his request.” However, it is stretching these provisions to suggest that the deputising of the President’s functions extends to being the Party candidate for the position of President of the country in terms of national electoral laws. Even if this were the case, in the absence of a “request” by Mugabe, how the choice is to be made between the two Vice Presidents is not indicated. The top three members of the ZANU PF Presidium also currently occupy the same posts provided for in Zimbabwe’s State Constitution. In the event of Mugabe’s sudden demise, the State Constitution stipulates that the Vice President who last acted as President, or who has been specifically chosen by Mugabe to do so, will assume power in the inter-regnum period. It is possible that, if Mugabe indicates a preference under the State Constitution, this will be taken to constitute “the request” for purpose of the ZANU PF Constitution, but there is no legal requirement that this be so, and the issue may be a point of contention between the two ZANU PF Vice Presidents.

There have also been suggestions, from some of those considered to be pretenders to the throne, that the ranking of the members of the Politburo “in order of precedence” under the ZANU PF Constitution sets the order of precedence for succession to the presidency. However, what is intended by the “ranking” of the members of the Politburo under the ZANU PF Constitution, and what privileges are intended to be conferred by holding a higher ranking, is not indicated by the ZANU PF Constitution. There is certainly nothing to indicate that the person holding the highest ranking must succeed the President in the event of his sudden demise.

If ZANU PF is to rely upon its electoral process for the replacement of Mugabe, as it seems it ought, certain practical difficulties present themselves.

The electoral process requires that all ten PCCs submit nominees for “election” to the Presidium by the Congress. The Provincial Co-ordinating Committees, as has been seen, are large and unwieldy bodies. They comprise the Provincial Executive Council and provincial members of the Central Committee, National Consultative Assembly, Executive Committee of Women’s League, Executive Committee of the Youth League, Members of Parliament, and, until recently, the Chairpersons of District Coordinating Committees. Many of these bodies are themselves comprised of other components of the Party structure. Annexure B expands each of these so that the highly complex nature of the PCC is apparent. Each PCC thus usually comprises as many as 100 to 110 members. In theory, the composition of the PCCs make them extremely democratic bodies, and the large number of members drawn from disparate sectors of the ZANU PF structures ought to make it extremely difficult for any individual to exert political pressure upon a PCC in the selection of the nominee for “election” as president by Congress.

However, this is both the forte and foible of the PCC. It will require particularly astute, efficient, and active political commissars at all levels to ensure that delegates to the PCC are properly identified and attend the special electoral conferences of the PCCs. Furthermore, since the PCC comprises elements of other Party structures, it is necessary that these structures are in place and properly formed when it

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59 Wait a While, Aspiring Leaders Told The Herald 24.05.12.
60 Section 31(1)(b)(i) of the State Constitution.
61 Zanu PF Succession Won't be Hierarchical The Zimbabwe Independent 07.07.12.
becomes necessary to convene each PCC as an electoral college. This is by no means certain given the current state of ZANU PF’s internal politics.

The election of the DCCs, for example, was particularly fraught. Several elections were annulled, or postponed as a result, and on one occasion police had to disperse rival supporters by firing shots into the air. The Politburo specifically cited the “divisive” nature of the DCC elections as the reason for the dissolution of this component of the ZANU PF structure. It has been suggested that these elections were hotly contested and controversial because of the influence the DCCs have in the PCCs which, as the electoral college, are central to ZANU PF’s succession politics. However, as is seen here, the chairpersons of the DCCs did not constitute a large component of each PCC. There was only an average of nine DCCs in each province. However, as the engine room of ZANU PF’s organisational structure, the DCCs wielded an influence far beyond mere voting numbers. The DCCs played a key role in subduing the rural electorate prior to the presidential run-off election of 2008. The chairpersons of each DCC appear to have established fiefdoms in the areas under their control. The requirement that the PCCs must ensure that each Administrative District has at least one member appointed to the Central Committee (see above) makes it probable that the appointee was the DCC chairman. Control of the DCCs was thus seen as the route to enormous political influence within ZANU PF.

The disbanding of the DCCs poses a conundrum for ZANU PF succession politics. All DCC chairmen were part of the PCCs. If these PCCs meet as an electoral college to choose the nominee for president prior to the ratification of the dissolution of the DCCs by Congress, the question arises as to whether the chairpersons of the DCCs should still be included as part of the PCCs.

The Achilles’ heel of any electoral process which relies upon an internal electoral college is that it is susceptible to challenge on the grounds that the college making the selection was not properly constituted. Even prior to the dissolution of the DCCs, it is obvious that the PCCs were particularly vulnerable to such a charge. If the DCC chairpersons are excluded from the PCCs prior to the ratification of the necessary constitutional amendment by Congress, this will provide a glaring opportunity to assert that their exclusion invalidates the proceedings of the electoral college. In a contested nomination process, an allegation that merely one of the PCCs was not properly convened, and its nomination thus invalid, is likely to effect the determination of who are the nominees with the highest votes for purposes of being reconsidered by the ten PCCs as outlined above.

The practical difficulties do not end there if the intention is that the selection of the nominee for ZANU PF President is to be put forward as the nominee “of” ZANU PF as State President under section 28(3)(b) of the State Constitution. The nominee that wins the vote of six provinces must be elected by Congress. But extraordinary sessions of Congress may only be convened on 42 days (six weeks) notice. Furthermore, as noted earlier, it is unclear whether an extraordinary session of the National People’s Conference must be convened to “declare” the Party President as the Party candidate for State President as required by section 31(3) of the Party Constitution. Recall that the Parliamentary Electoral College must make its choice within 90 days of the President’s demise, and that the Clerk of Parliament must call for nominations 14 days before the election. This means that the

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62 Mugabe Flies Into ZANU PF Storm Daily News 08.07.12.
63 See ZANU PF DCCs Disbanded above.
65 See the anonymous report The Anatomy of Terror available at http://www.sokwanele.com/node/2333.
66 See above.
67 It is not specifically stated at whose instance such extraordinary sessions are convened. However since such sessions are “conducted” by the Central Committee it is likely to be held to have this responsibility – see section 31(2) of the ZANU PF Constitution.
Parliamentary Electoral College may convene no sooner than 14 days, and no later than 76 days, after the demise of the President. Accordingly, within this timeframe the PCCs must convene, submit their nominations, and resolve and resubmit nominations in the event of a contested process; the Congress must convene and “elect” the person so nominated – a process which might be protracted given the ambiguities as to the elective power of Congress in this regard; and the National People’s Conference may need to convene to declare the Party President “elected by Congress” as the candidate for National President.

It is thus unlikely that ZANU PF will be able to select a candidate for the Parliamentary Electoral College within the requisite timeframe if this process is followed, particularly if the Clerk of Parliament sets an early election date. The role and power of the Clerk of Parliament will thus be extremely important and possibly decisive. It is worth noting here that the Electoral Act only attends to a situation where there are competing candidates or a single candidate. It does not deal with a situation where no nominee has been put forward within the requisite timeframe.

If ZANU PF’s Constitution is followed, therefore, the selection of a single candidate to replace Mugabe is likely to be difficult. The Supreme Court may be extremely busy over this period.

**ZANU PF Succession Process in Practice.**

In order to consider how the succession to the presidency within ZANU PF might unfold, it is instructive to look at past successions to positions within the Presidium.

a) the Fault Lines

The conventional wisdom in Zimbabwe is that there are two main factions within ZANU PF contending for the presidency on Mugabe’s departure; those who grouped around the late Solomon Mujuru, and now are now grouped around his wife Joice, and those grouped around Emmerson Mnangagwa. Each of these has advanced differing and expedient perspectives on manner in which the Presidium of ZANU PF is to be constituted to advance the cause of favoured candidates to the posts.

The blurring of the lines between ZANU PF as a party and the State has been a hallmark of Zimbabwe’s polity since 1980, and is reflected in the ZANU PF Party Constitution itself. The State and ZANU PF Constitution both establish the posts of a president and two vice-presidents. Those holding the posts under the State Constitution have always been the same individuals who hold the posts under the Party Constitution. This supposition arises from an even deeper presumptuousness embedded in the Party Constitution – that ZANU PF is the sole legitimate voice of the people of Zimbabwe. The preamble to the Party Constitution reads like that of a State Constitution rather than that of a political party, commencing with the statement “we the people of Zimbabwe” not “we the members of ZANU PF”. Furthermore, following the Unity Accord between the two main rival political groupings of the 1980s in terms of which ZAPU was absorbed into ZANU PF, the ZANU PF Constitution excludes the possibility of multiparty democracy, purporting “to unite all the people of Zimbabwe under a single political party”. The objectives of the Party likewise read like those of a government, the first of these being “to preserve and defend the National Sovereignty and Independence of Zimbabwe”.

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68 The on-going legal battle in which MDC Parliamentarians are seeking the incumbent Clerk’s dismissal is thus of considerable significance.
69 Reports concerning those contending for the presidency are usually based upon conjecture and political gossip. Recently it has been suggested that those formerly aligned to Solomon Mujuru were rallying around Sydney Sekeramayi as successor - see Generals Ditch Mujuru in Succession Struggle The Standard 24.06.12.
70 It has already been noted that the powers accorded to the Central Committee are predicated upon the assumption that ZANU PF will always be the ruling party. This supposition arises from an even deeper presumptuousness embedded in the Party Constitution – that ZANU PF is the sole legitimate voice of the people of Zimbabwe. The preamble to the Party Constitution reads like that of a State Constitution rather than that of a political party, commencing with the statement “we the people of Zimbabwe” not “we the members of ZANU PF”. Furthermore, following the Unity Accord between the two main rival political groupings of the 1980s in terms of which ZAPU was absorbed into ZANU PF, the ZANU PF Constitution excludes the possibility of multiparty democracy, purporting “to unite all the people of Zimbabwe under a single political party”. The objectives of the Party likewise read like those of a government, the first of these being “to preserve and defend the National Sovereignty and Independence of Zimbabwe”.

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posts under the Party Constitution. With Mugabe having the unfettered discretion\textsuperscript{71} to appoint both Vice Presidents under the State Constitution, this power impacts upon the processes under the Party Constitution.\textsuperscript{72} No terms limits are prescribed for those holding the positions of president and vice president under the State Constitution. Combined with the fact that there is no unequivocal statement of term limits for the Presidium under the ZANU PF Constitution, a sector within ZANU PF, and particularly the Presidium itself, which of course includes Mujuru, have advanced the notion that unless there is a “vacancy” in the Presidium, the nominations from the Provinces prior to Congress for the top three positions are a mere formality, in the same way as the People’s Conference is required yearly to declare the President of the Party as the ZANU PF candidate for State President. Mugabe and his supporters have thus adopted the refrain that “there is no vacancy in the Presidium.”\textsuperscript{73}

This assumption of the right to office by the incumbents is disputed and contested by those aligned to Mnangagwa, who contend that fresh elections to all posts within the Presidium must take place every five years by way of nominations from the Provinces. These nominations are not to be merely a formal and automatic endorsement of the incumbents.

A second fault line dividing the Mujuru and Mnangagwa camps is a result of the Unity Accord which absorbed Joshua Nkomo’s PF ZAPU Party into ZANU PF in December 1987.\textsuperscript{74} One section of ZANU PF claims an unwritten term of the Unity Accord is that the four posts in the Presidium will be divided between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU, with ZANU PF holding the presidency and a vice-presidential post and PF ZAPU holding the other vice presidential position and the post of National Chairman. Since the power base of PF ZAPU is in Matabeleland, the further inference by some is that the PF ZAPU posts will be held by members of the majority ethnic group in Matabeleland, the Ndebele. However, many of those aligned to the Mnangagwa camp have taken the understanding concerning the distribution of posts within the Presidium along ethnic lines further, and maintain that it ought to be party policy that the all major ethnic groups in Zimbabwe, the Zezuru, Manyika, Karanga, and Ndebele, will be represented in the Presidium.

The ethnic analysis of ZANU PF’s succession battle views the contest as between the Zezuru (represented by the Mujuru faction) and the Karanga (represented by Mnangagwa).\textsuperscript{75} Both are seen as periodically endeavouring to forge alliances with the Manyika and Ndebele groupings. It certainly seems to be outside any coincidence that the Head of State, Mugabe, Vice-president (Mujuru), the head of the judiciary, Godfrey Chidyausiku, the head of the Defence Forces, Constantine Chiwenga, the Head of the Air Force, Perence Shiri, the head of the Police, Augustine Chihuri, and the Registrar-General of Elections are all Zezuru.\textsuperscript{76} None of the four Cabinet Ministers\textsuperscript{77} excluded from the

\textsuperscript{71}Section 31C of the State Constitution. This discretion was made subject to the approval of the MDC Prime Minister by way of Constitutional Amendment 19, but it is a limitation which Mugabe has ignored and the Prime Minister has not sought to enforce.

\textsuperscript{72} A similar and extremely important conjunction exists with the appointment by Mugabe of members of the Central Committee to the Politburo and the appointment of most of the same individuals by Mugabe as Ministers in Government in terms of section 31D of the State constitution. Their appointment as Ministers once again requires the Prime Minister’s approval, a provision which has been likewise ignored, but not the allocation of portfolios – see D. Matyszak (2009).

\textsuperscript{73} No Vacancies in Presidium, Says President Africa News Service 15.12.2006.

\textsuperscript{74} The accord ended the bloody Gukurahundi period in which an estimated 20,000 people in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces where killed by the 5th Brigade deployed to the region ostensibly to crush ZAPU aligned “dissidents.”

\textsuperscript{75} See for example Tribal Tensions AtZanu PF Congress in Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Independent 11.12.09 and The Zimbabwe Electoral Struggle http://saharareporters.com/interview/zimbabwe-electoral-struggle.

\textsuperscript{76} Philip Sihanda, the head of the Army is Karanga.
Politburo are Zezuru. Masvingo and Midlands Provinces, home to the Karanga, have consistently opposed nominations to the Presidium comprising people of Zezuru and Ndebele backgrounds only (see below). The most contentious of the DCC elections took place in Masvingo and Manicaland. However, while some factions within ZANU PF might wish to exploit ethnic considerations, several political observers have cautioned against using ethnicity as an analytical lens through which the internal dynamics of ZANU PF may be viewed. For several years, and most obviously in the aftermath of Mugabe’s electoral defeat in March 2008 (when those heading the security sectors stepped in to ensure Mugabe’s “victory” in the presidential run-off election in June), it has been evident that the President and any aspirant to the presidency are heavily dependent upon support from the security sector. ZANU PF succession politics may be conceptualised in terms of the extent to which the wooing of securocrats has been accepted or rebuffed, and the extent to which the securocrats believe which of the three – Mugabe, Mujuru or Mnangagwa are best able to safeguard their positions and the status quo. This in turn infers the extent to which each of these are prepared to protect the positions of the ZANU PF old guard, most of whom, having played prominent roles in the “liberation war”, believe in “rule by entitlement” by virtue of their contributions made during the war.

c) Early Manoeuvring

From the time the executive presidency was created, and the Unity Accord signed, there was little challenge to the triumvirate of Mugabe as President and Joshua Nkomo and Simon Muzenda as Vice-Presidents. The only position which admitted any fluidity was that of National Chairman, a possible future stepping stone to the vice-presidency on the demise of any one of the two vice-presidents. The history of the Presidium since 1987 is set out in Annexure C.

Positioning and manoeuvring around the issue of succession to Mugabe began as early as 1999, when sectors within ZANU PF were, correctly as it transpired, beginning to view Mugabe as an electoral liability. The Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions first locked horns following the death, on the 1st of July of that year, of Joshua Nkomo, then the PF ZAPU nominated Vice President. Pursuant to what one PF ZAPU member has described as a series of “secret meetings”, the National Party Chairman, Joseph Msika was “elected” as the new Vice-President by the Congress which convened in December 1999. Although a member of PF ZAPU, and raised in Matabeleland, Msika was Zezuru, the same ethnic group as Mugabe. This caused disgruntlement within PF ZAPU who felt that Msika had been imposed from above, and, not being Ndebele, was not an appropriate representative of the Matabeleland Provinces. However, being fourth in the Presidium hierarchy, and previously second in command to Joshua Nkomo within ZAPU, his elevation to the Vice-Presidency was not overtly contentious.

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77 They are Kembo Mohadi, Home Affairs (Venda); Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, Foreign Affairs (Karanga); Joseph Made, Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (Manyika); Walter Mzembi, Tourism and Hospitality Industry (Karanga).

78 See Ibbotson Mandaza Zanu PF Congress' Historical and Political Significance The Zimbabwe Independent 18.12.09. Mandaza elsewhere contends that there have been expectations that Mugabe might retire in the early 1990s and that many senior ZANU PF officials have never been comfortable with the concept of Mugabe as President-for-life – see Will ZANU PF Survive After Mugabe p3 http://www.africaresearch institute.org/files/book-downloads/docs/ Will-ZANU-PF-survive-after-Mugabe-Q5UF7JVG4U.pdf. And see also, by implication, the important analyses of ZANU PF historiographies in Luise White The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Indiana, 2003).

79 In the Presidential election of 1990 the Edgar Tekere (former close confidant of Mugabe and ZANU PF stalwart who had fallen out with Mugabe in 1981) of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement polled a remarkable 16% of the vote despite Mugabe’s exclusive control over all media in the country and extensive abuse of state resources and the security sector to promote his candidacy. Mugabe’s narrow “victory” in the presidential election of 2002 is widely believed to have been achieved through violence and the manipulation of the electoral process.

80 On 01.07.99.

81 Dumiso Dabengwa, head of the regrouped ZAPU, quoted in Zanu PF ‘Tried to Impose’ Nkomo Successor Newsday 21.12.11.
The promotion of Msika to the Vice-Presidency left the position of National Chairperson open, and Emmerson Mnangagwa threw his hat into the ring for this position. Had he succeeded in this quest, he would have been in pole position to succeed Vice-President Simon Muzenda, also a Karanga, and within reach of the Presidency after Mugabe’s departure. It was apparently astute political manoeuvring by Solomon Mujuru, however, that secured the nomination of John Nkomo, an Ndebele, from eight of the ten provinces.\(^2\) As an Ndebele, Nkomo was an unlikely rival to Mujuru’s choice for the presidency when the opportunity arose – as it did with the death of Simon Muzenda in September 2003.\(^3\)

**d) The Tsholotsho Saga**

With the vacancy now occurring in the ZANU PF wing of the Vice-Presidency, the appointment of the replacement was never going to be smooth. The fractious nature of the process is indicated by the fact that the vacancy was not filled officially until some 15 months had passed, at the ZANU PF Congress of December 2004. A bruising battle took place between the Mujuru and Mnangagwa camps in the intervening period, from which Mujuru emerged the stronger.

Before then, the grouping around Mnangagwa appears to have been in the ascendency in the Provinces for several years prior to Muzenda’s death, and seemed likely to be able to muster the support for nomination from the required six Provinces for the Vice Presidency. To further Mnangagwa’s chances, his supporters sought to advance the principles expounded in what became known as the “Tsholotsho Declaration”. Jonathan Moyo, a prominent turncoat politician, was a key player in the drama which unfolded. He has written in detail about the events.\(^4\) In his account, Moyo maintains that the Tsholotsho Declaration is made up of four principles:

i) that all the country’s four major ethnic groups, Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele should be represented in the Presidium;

ii) that the position of president should not be monopolised by one ethnic group but rotate among the four major ethnic groupings;

iii) that the filling of positions in the Presidium should not be by imposition by the Party hierarchy but through democratic elections done by secret balloting; and

iv) such positions must be filled in accordance with the Party Constitution.

Since the Mujuru aspirant to the position, Joice Mujuru is Zezuru, already represented in the Presidium by Mugabe, support for the Declaration was seen as support for Mnangagwa as Vice President. Those supporting these principles envisaged a Presidium with Mugabe, a Zezuru, as President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, a Karanga, as one Vice-President with an Ndebele co-Vice President, and “young Turk”\(^5\) and legal advisor to ZANU PF Patrick Chinamasa (Manyika) as National Chairman.\(^6\) The Declaration threw down the gauntlet to those who believed that the top three positions in the Presidency were inviolable until a vacancy occurred and that two of the top four positions should be occupied by former PF ZAPU members. Among them was Mugabe who did not

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\(^3\) On 20.09.03.

\(^4\) *Tsholotsho Saga: The Untold Story* published in three parts in the Zimbabwe Independent in April, 2006.

\(^5\) Although born on the 27.01.47, Chinamasa (65) is younger than many of the ZANU PF “old guard” who are in their 70s and 80s.

\(^6\) Although a prominent figure in ZANU PF politics Patrick Chinamasa is a “mafikizolo” or “newcomer” in terms of the ZANU PF hierarchy. Despite the prominent role he plays in ZANU PF as Minister of Justice and negotiator with the opposition MDC, he is currently a non-voting member of the Politburo, holding the post of Deputy Secretary of Legal Affairs under Mnangagwa.
intend to be hampered by the inconvenience that there was nothing in the ZANU PF Constitution which supported his views.

After a series of meetings in August, 2003, headed by provincial chairmen and provincial governors, presided over by the national political commissar, it was clear that Mnangagwa had the support for the Vice Presidency from all except three Provinces - Mashonaland Central, Harare and Mashonaland East.

The Mujuru alignment, which included elements from the three disaffected Provinces, came together shortly after these meetings began. A strategy was devised whereby a sudden sensitivity to gender issues was to be used to undermine the Mnangagwa group. The Mujuru camp thus latched upon a resolution, first put forward by the Women’s League at its August 1999 meeting in Victoria Falls, that one of the four members of the Presidium must be a woman. The Women’s League was prevailed upon to repeat its demand at its plenary meeting of 2nd September 2004. Accompanied by his wife Grace, Mugabe attended the meeting and announced that he supported this demand.

The Mnangagwa faction was unimpressed. The date for nominations to the posts in the Presidium from the Provinces was set for the 21st November, 2004. Under the cover of an invitation as guest of honour at Dinyane High School for a prize giving ceremony, Mnangagwa prepared to go to Tsholotsho on the 18th November, 2004, where, not coincidently, Chairmen of the Provinces would be present to hear his speech. Austin Zvoma, who will play a key role should the combined Houses of Parliament sit as an electoral college to determine Mugabe’s successors (see above), facilitated the crafting of the speech for Mnangagwa by George Charamba. The Tsholotsho meeting could not be seen as anything other than a direct challenge to Mugabe’s authority. It was clear that Mugabe’s intention was that the vacancy left by Muzenda’s death was to be filled by Joice Mujuru. The Tsholotsho gathering appeared to be intended to counter this by advancing the Tsholotsho principles.

Mugabe called an emergency Politburo meeting for the same day, the 18th November 2004. The result of the meeting was that the Politburo declared that it had “amended” the Party Constitution to include the demand of the Women’s League that one of the Vice Presidents be a woman. Less widely publicised, but of even more significance, was the amendment providing that the Provincial Electoral Colleges would no longer be the 44-member Provincial Executive Councils but the much larger Provincial Co-ordinating Committees. The election would thus be conducted under the watchful eye of the Central Committee members from the Province, some of whom would undoubtedly be Politburo members who had agreed to the amendment. The latter amendment was clearly designed to neutralise the Mnangagwa faction’s control over the Provincial Executive Councils in seven Provinces.

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87 Elliot Manyika. The ZANU PF Constitution does not establish any body composed of these delegates.
88 Mujuru’s home province.
89 This is according to Jonathan Moyo.
90 The League had threatened to boycott the forthcoming December Congress if its demands were not met - see Old Guards Tighten Grip On Power IPS 15.12.99 http://www.ipsnews.net/ 1999/12/politics-zimbabwe-old-guards-tighten-grip-on-power/. It does not seem that the threat was carried out, but the requirement that one third of the total membership of the principal organs of the Party be women, may have been introduced into the ZANU PF Constitution at the Congress (section 19(13)). Section 36 also repeats this requirement in relation to the Politburo.
91 Then headed by the 72 year old Thenjiwe Lesabe.
92 This raises questions as to Zvoma’s impartiality. Charamba is presently press secretary in the President’s Office, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and one of ZANU PF’s most erudite and prolific apologists.
93 The amendment was to section 32(1)(b) by adding to the requirement that there be two Vice presidents the phrase “one of whom shall be a woman”.
94 As outlined above, the PCCs also contain greater quota Women’s League members.
95 Jonathan Moyo suggests in his account of events that the election would also no longer be by secret ballot. This may possibly have been the directive from the Politburo. The Party Constitution was not amended to reflect this.
With perverse cynicism, Mnangagwa, as Secretary for Legal Affairs, was given the task of drafting the necessary amendments to the ZANU PF Constitution. This required the alteration of only a few words, but, deciding that discretion was the better part of valour, Mnangagwa pleaded this commitment to stay well away from the meeting in Tsholotsho. As ZANU PF Secretary for Administration in the Politburo, and, in what was to be one of his last few acts as such, he was also given the task of writing to the Provinces to explain the new nomination procedure. Aware that the knives were being sharpened in Harare, and with Mnangagwa literally and metaphorically distancing himself from events, most of those meeting in Tsholotsho made a belated and feeble attempt to be seen as compliant with Mugabe’s wishes. Purporting to obey the directive that resulted from the Politburo meeting earlier in the day, they changed their original line up for the Presidium to the extent only that Thenjiwe Lesabe, an Ndebele woman, be a second Vice President. This was probably believed to be the lesser show of defiance. The proposal was still unprecedented. It would require the removal of an incumbent, Joseph Msika, from the Vice Presidency. The directive from the Politburo and thus from Mugabe - and thus from Mugabe - had made it clear that nominations from the Provinces were expected only with regard to the single vacant post of Vice President.

The Women’s League duly met on the 22nd November, 2004, and formally declared Joice Mujuru to be their choice as the woman to succeed Muzenda, in accordance with the instruction from the Politburo. The direction of the wind was clear. Six out of the ten provinces thereafter duly nominated Mujuru as their candidate. And the 6th December, Congress obediently “elected” Mujuru as Vice President. Mugabe, apparently euphoric at his successful exercise of political muscle, imprudently stated to the gathering: "When you choose her as a Vice President, you don’t want her to remain in that chair do you?" Given what had transpired, the suggestion that Mujuru had been “chosen” by Congress was hardly accurate.

Mugabe moved swiftly against those who had sought to defy his choice of anointed appointee. The Tuesday before the weekend Congress, the Politburo “suspended” the six Provincial Chairmen and Jabulani Sibanda, head of the Zimbabwe War Veterans Association, who had been present in Tsholotsho. It was the first of several axings. On the 17th December, 2004, Mugabe announced a new and expanded Politburo of 51 members. Jonathan Moyo was removed from the Politburo (and subsequently the Party, and also as Minister of Information). Emmerson Mnangagwa was deposed as Secretary for Administration – effectively the Party’s Secretary General and fifth in the Party hierarchy - and replaced by Didymus Mutasa. He was given the post of secretary for legal affairs (12th in the Politburo hierarchy) displacing Chinamasa who was to deputise him thus becoming a junior member without voting rights.

Mugabe explained the measures as follows:

Those who were suspended will remain suspended and will be disciplined by the national chairman, while their vacancies will be filled in the future… There is everything wrong when chairpersons of the Party go and meet secretly without the knowledge of the leadership of the Party, and worse still, what would they be discussing there? There is no party run like

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96 This is notwithstanding the fact that a light aircraft had been arranged to convey Mnangagwa to Dinyane so that he could attend both the prize-giving ceremony at the school and the Politburo meeting. The extraordinary effort which was put into Mnangagwa’s attendance belies the suggestion that the meeting was an innocent school prize-giving ceremony.

97 This is the only time Mugabe has hinted at his preference for a successor, and is a comment he later came to regret (see below).

98 July Moyo (Midlands; also Minister of Energy), Mark Madiro (Manicaland), Daniel Shumba (Masvingo), Jacob Mudenda (Matabeleland North), Lloyd Siyoka (Matabeleland South), and Thomas Ncube (Bulawayo).

99 In February, 2005.
that….When the war was fought, we fought as one on all fronts.\textsuperscript{100} We didn't ask guerrillas where they came from, asi anena Mafikizolo ndovaakati uyu anobva kwakati? \textit{Uyu anobva kwakati} (but the newcomers would ask “you come from where? you come from where?) and so on. They should know we are non-tribalists and non-regionalists.\textsuperscript{101}

The Tsholotsho saga continues to reverberate through ZANU PF’s succession and internal politics.

Several issues arising from the saga require comment for present purposes.

e) The Power of the Politburo

Although ZANU PF has been structured in a manner which allows the choice of successors to the Presidium to be extremely democratic, the actual process is best described as “guided democracy”\textsuperscript{102}, with Mugabe as the tiller man and the Politburo as the crew. The Politburo had no power to amend the constitution to mandate a female Vice President or to change the composition of the Provincial Electoral Colleges. That power lies with the Central Committee (subject to ratification by Congress) and the Congress itself. The Congress nonetheless ratified the changes which had been unlawfully made by the Politburo to accord with Mugabe’s intentions and strategy.\textsuperscript{103} The Politburo also had no power to suspend the Provincial Chairpersons, and the National Chairman no power to discipline them.

In the role of implementer of Mugabe’s policies, using procedures often outside the confines of the Party Constitution, the Politburo has become enormously powerful since Tsholotsho. Rather than the Congress controlling the Central Committee, the Central Committee controlling the Politburo and the Politburo directing the Presidium, the flow of power is in precisely the opposite direction. ZANU PF spokesman, Rugare Gumbo, has candidly stated that \textit{“The politburo is the policy-making body outside congress”}.\textsuperscript{104} The Politburo thus has arrogated the power to itself to dismiss members of the PCC; to reject nominees to the Central Committee by the PCCs;\textsuperscript{105}\textsuperscript{106} barred individuals from contesting for the post of Provincial Chairperson;\textsuperscript{107} cancelled polls of Party structures;\textsuperscript{108} and even gone so far (as will be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item A singularly ahistorical statement given the extended and vain efforts of the Frontline States to get the Mugabe’s ZANLA forces to co-ordinate with Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA cadres.
\item Quoted in the Zimbabwe Mirror Mugabe Fires Moyo 18.12.04. ZANU PF prevented Moyo from standing again as MP in Tsholotsho by claiming that the seat was reserved for a woman. When Moyo defied the directive he was dismissed from the Party winning the seat as an independent.
\item The phrase “guided democracy” or “managed democracy” was first used in relation to the Indonesian style of governance which prevented the electorate from having a significant impact on governmental policies. It has been adopted by commentators on ZANU PF’s succession policies – see for example Brain Mangwende Nominations Expose Deep Divisions in ZANU-PF Financial Gazette 20.11.09.
\item In this regard comments made by the US Ambassador, Christopher Dell, to Zimbabwe revealed in Wikileaks cable O4HARARE14 seem ill-informed and naïve: “The Party showed itself capable of following its processes in an orderly (and yes, even somewhat democratic) manner in conducting what was a fractious contest for an important position. Different factions and figures all participated in a remarkably inclusive process. We are unaware of evidence that President Mugabe stepped in to exert decisive influence; quite the contrary, several insider reports indicated that Msika resisted Mugabe’s (and others’) efforts to get him to relinquish his VP seat and that Mugabe otherwise kept above the fray.”
\item See Mugabe Succession Game Plan Exposed The Standard 29.04.12. As outlined above, the Politburo is the Secretariat of the Central Committee. It is this 240 member body, not the 29 voting members of the Politburo which is to exercise the powers of Congress when Congress is not in session.
\item Made in terms of section 32(2) of the ZANU PF Constitution.
\item See Faction-riddled Byo Elects Central Committee Members The Zimbabwe Independent 28.10.10.
\item See, for example, \textit{Mugabe Blocks Chiyangwa’s Election Bid} http://www.radiovop.com 04.11.11.
\item See, for example, \textit{Probe, Nullify Disputed DCC Polls: Politburo} The Herald 17.05.12. and \textit{Politburo Orders Re-run of Disputed DCC Elections} http://www.thezimbabwemail.com 16.05.12
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seen) to claim the power to control and veto nominations for the Presidium from the Provinces. None of these powers is vested in the Politburo by the Party’s Constitution.

f) Mugabe’s Power

The ZANU PF-controlled State media presents Mugabe’s retention of the Presidency as being the result of an unchallenged consensus within ZANU PF. Similarly, the overview of the Tsholotsho saga, outlined above, might tend to give the impression that after these events Mugabe was entirely secure within the Party. This is not the case, and, at times, Mugabe’s hold on power has been tenuous.

The confluence between the State and Party Presidium has been noted. A similar and extremely important conjunction exists with the appointment, by Mugabe, of members of the Central Committee to the Politburo, and the appointment of the same individuals by Mugabe as Ministers in Government. That these powers allow Mugabe to control the Politburo were plainly evident during the Tsholotsho saga if they had not been before. To deepen the well of largesse, and further strengthen his ability to exercise control over the Party through the Politburo, Mugabe (apparently unilaterally and unconstitutionally) increased the size of this body to 51 members.

The unconstitutional actions by Mugabe and the centralisation of power at the top echelons of the Party hierarchy have caused considerable disgruntlement in the Mnangagwa camp at lower levels of the Party structure. It is significant that, despite the pressure brought to bear, only six Provinces eventually endorsed Mujuru as the nominee to be elected by the December Congress of 2004. Four Provinces - Bulawayo, Matabeleland South, the Midlands and Masvingo - remained obdurate, also refusing to nominate John Nkomo (who would complete the Ndebele/PF ZAPU balance) as National Chairman, and persisting, in line with the Tsholotsho principles, to nominate Patrick Chinamasa (a Manyika) for this post. The defiance from the Bulawayo PCC was complete, with this Province refusing even to nominate a woman as Vice President as the other rebellious Provinces had done in accordance with the directive from the Politburo. They also refused to nominate several of Mugabe’s preferred candidates to the Central Committee. An infuriated Mugabe and members of the Politburo exerted extreme pressure in a vain attempt to try to bring the Bulawayo PCC into line.

Further indications of Mugabe’s insecurity within the Party emerged in graphic fashion two years after the Tsholotsho saga. The saga, and Mugabe’s apparent anointment of Joice Mujuru as the chosen

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110 Appointed in terms of section 31D of the State Constitution. Their appointment as Ministers once again requires the Prime Minister’s approval, a provision which has been likewise ignored, but not the allocation of portfolios – see D. Matyszak (2009).
111 Late ZANU PF legal guru Edison Zvobgo is quoted in a 2001 Wikileaks cable 01HARARE114 as stating “The Party no longer acts as a check on the President’s powers. Instead the Party is simply an instrument of the President. During the 1980s, the politburo was known to overrule Mugabe on policy matters, but now Mugabe is a ‘majority of one’ in the Party. Anyone who wants to survive must please the president by saying what he thinks Mugabe wants to hear.”
112 If the 2004 Congress introduced a constitutional amendment increasing the size of the Politburo it was not reported upon. The Politburo is currently believed to comprise 58 members – see annexure A.
113 An overt expression of this appeared on 16.09.06 in an article written by former CIO Operative, Central Committee Member and ZANU PF legislator Pearson Mhalekwa – The Truth Behind Tsholotsho Declaration The Zimbabwe Independent. Mhalekwa resigned from ZANU PF on 01.07.05 and formed the United Peoples Movement, which he claimed was a front for Mnangagwa – see Wikileaks cable 05Harare1591.
114 Midlands and Masvingo.
115 Thus proposing Mnangagwa and Msika for the posts.
116 They included former ZAPU stalwart DumisoDabengwa and deputy political commissar Sikhanyiso Ndlovu.
117 See Mugabe Explodes The Daily Mirror 23.11.04. In keeping with the political rhetoric of the time Mugabe accused the members of the Bulawayo PCC as being “mischievous individuals misleading people by using money from white capitalists… Their actions are meant to sideline the old leadership of the Party through clandestine ways…” The report suggests that Mugabe and members of the Politburo travelled to Bulawayo a week after the nominations to meet with the Provincial Chairman.
successor at the Congress, led Mujuru to believe that her time was at hand and that Mugabe would not stand for election in 2008. Mugabe indeed signalled that he did not wish to stand for election in 2008, but not in the manner that those seeking to occupy the presidency wished. Never enthusiastic about facing the electorate, either nationally or within ZANU PF, Mugabe proposed the “harmonisation” of Parliamentary and Presidential elections. While there was general consensus within the country that elections be harmonised, the understanding was that the Parliamentary election, due in 2010, would be brought forward to coincide with the Presidential election, due in 2008, rather than the converse. Mugabe, however, aware of his diminishing support within the Party as a candidate in 2008, sought, with the support of the secuorcrats, to postpone the Presidential election until Parliamentary elections were due.

Although Mugabe’s plan to extend his term of office had been rebuffed by both the Politburo and Central Committee, he presented the scheme to the ZANU PF National People’s Conference held at Goromonz in December 2006. Following intensive lobbying by both the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions, Mugabe found no takers for his proposal. To avoid embarrassment to Mugabe, the Conference took the unprecedented step of not passing any resolutions and indicated that the suggestion had been referred to the PCCs. In the wake of this humiliation, Mugabe apparently sent emissaries to the Provinces to gauge his support as Party candidate for the earlier election which he would now have to contest in 2008. Seven of the ten were opposed to his candidacy with three uncommitted or fence-sitting.

Mugabe’s view that his defeat in Goromonz was part of Joice Mujuru’s bid for the presidency appears to have been consolidated following the publication of Edgar Tekere’s autobiography A Life Time of Struggle. Mugabe claimed that Mujuru had plotted with Ibbotson Mandaza, the publisher of the book, to denigrate his role during the “liberation war” to further her presidential ambitions. He launched a scathing attack on Mujuru during a February 2007 interview on the occasion of his 83rd birthday. Mugabe stated:

*The Tekere/Mandaza issue, ah they are trying to campaign for Mujuru using the book...you can’t become a president by using a biography. Manjevairasa (they have lost the plot). They don’t realise they have done her more harm than good.*

The somewhat paranoid sounding Mugabe added:

“*The way to any post in the Party is through the people. It is not through n’angas (witch doctors). Others are using biographies. We do not take notice of that but we move along the path, the people’s way.*”

Further evidence of Mugabe’s insecurity over this period is manifest in his decision to convene an extraordinary Congress at the end of 2007. The main purpose of the extraordinary Congress was to affirm Mugabe as the Party Presidential candidate for 2008, which, given that this is a routine duty of the National People’s Conference, could hardly be said to justify the need to bring together the

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118 Not only would the costs involved in two elections be avoided but since endemic violence accompanies each electoral period two electoral periods were generally seen as undesirable.

119 In the absence of any other explanation, the subsequent un-procedural instruction from the Politburo that the Bulawayo PCC be dissolved and fresh elections held, seemed to be a result of particular obduracy from this province to Mugabe’s plans – see ZANU PF Purges Anti-Mugabe Provinces The Standard 04.03.07

120 Mashonaland East, Harare, Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, Bulawayo, Masvingo and the Midlands were against. The prevacriating provinces were thus Mashonaland Central, Manicaland and Mashonaland West. This view of events is given by Jonathan Moyo – see Unravelling Zanu PF’s Extraordinary Congress The Zimbabwe Independent 28.09.07.

121 Mujuru Snubs Mugabe Bash The Standard 26.02.07.
reported 10,000 delegates to the Congress.\textsuperscript{122} To the extent that Mugabe had been “elected” to the Presidium by Congress in 2004, and declared the Party candidate for national elections by successive National People’s Conferences, this move, if not outside the provisions of the ZANU PF Constitution, and procedurally flawed, ought certainly to have been viewed as superfluous. It had no other purpose other than for Mugabe to counter those positioning themselves for his job. The ZANU PF-controlled Herald newspaper sought to justify the Congress by claiming, wrongly, that ZANU PF’s constitution required an extraordinary Congress to be held whenever the election for State President falls within a serving (ZANU PF) president’s term. Since the Central Committee sets the agenda for any Congress, and the approval of at least one third would have been required to convene the Congress, it is clear that Mugabe had the support of Central Committee members for this strategy. Delegates appeared at the Congress in T-Shirts bearing slogans such as "We support President Mugabe 100 percent", "The People’s Choice" and "Cde Mugabe for 2008".

To complement the objectives of the extraordinary Congress, the previously disgraced (and still apparently suspended) Jabulani Sibanda organised “a Million Man March” in support of Mugabe ahead of the Congress.\textsuperscript{123} Although ostensibly a demonstration to show support for Mugabe, despite “western powers opposition to his rule”\textsuperscript{124}, the real audience was obviously intended to be those within ZANU PF opposed to Mugabe’s candidacy.

Many of those opposed to Mugabe’s candidacy expressed their views through the ballot box in March 2008. In what was called Operation Bhora Musango (ball in the bush),\textsuperscript{125} many ZANU PF MPs were said to have encouraged their constituents to vote for ZANU PF in the Parliamentary elections, but to withhold their vote from Mugabe in the presidential race.\textsuperscript{126} Mugabe blamed these “divisions” in the Party for his defeat.

f) The Congress of 2009

These fissures and dynamics were all apparent in the ZANU PF Congress of December 2009, preceded once again by the death of a Vice President, this time Joseph Msika, in August of that year. Mugabe and the Politburo initially sought to control the succession process by directing that only the three Matabeleland provinces should submit nominations for the vacant position of “ZAPU” Vice President.\textsuperscript{127} While this may have satisfied that Ndebele sector within ZANU PF still smarting at the imposition of the ZAPU (but Zezuru), Msika, the division around the contentious issue of reserving two posts in the Presidium for ZAPU members emerged once more. Violence broke out during the nomination process at some PCCs.\textsuperscript{128} Of the three, only the recently “purged” Bulawayo Province agreed to nominate Mugabe’s preferred candidate, John Nkomo, for the post. The Politburo was compelled to open up the process to all ten Provinces.\textsuperscript{129} This allowed the divisions that had characterised the Tsholotsho saga to re-emerge. Midlands and Masvingo declined to immediately endorse the Presidium preferred by the Politburo, with Mugabe and Mujuru retaining their posts and John Nkomo and Simon Khaya Moyo (an Ndebele) as Vice President and National Chairman (to

\textsuperscript{122}The figure given by the Herald is probably exaggerated by several thousand – see \textit{Congress Endorses President} The Herald 14.12.07.
\textsuperscript{123}On 30.11.07. An embarrassing clash subsequently occurred at the Congress, broadcast on State television, when John Nkomo, Vice President and head of the National Disciplinary Committee which had suspended Sibanda, tried to stop Sibanda’s uninvited unscheduled attempt to make a speech from the podium – see \textit{Mugabe Seethes as Sibanda and Nkomo Clash at Congress} http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/zanupf8.17297.html.
\textsuperscript{124}Zim Vets in ‘Million Man’ Mugabe March Mail & Guardian 30.11.07.
\textsuperscript{125}ie. kick the ball (Mugabe) off the playing field.
\textsuperscript{126}Let Us Draw Lessons From Our Mistakes: Mutasa The Manica Post 21.01.12.
\textsuperscript{127}See Western Zim to Replace Msika The Post (Zambia) 15.10.09.
\textsuperscript{128}See Stalemate at ZANU PF Leadership Nominations The Standard 14.11.09.
\textsuperscript{129}Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland Declines to Nominate for Vice Presidential Slot VOA News 14.10.09.
replace the elevated Nkomo) respectively. Masvingo once again showed further recalcitrance by proposing that Oppah Muchinguri (a Manyika) replace Mujuru as a Vice President, but accepting the nomination of John Nkomo and Kembo Mohadi (from Matabeleland South, and Venda rather than Ndebele) as National Chairman. The Manicaland and Mashonaland Central PCCs also defied the Politburo by advancing Didymus Mutasa (a Manyika) as National Chairman.\(^{130}\) On account of these disputes, and nervous of possible attempts to nominate alternate candidates from the floor, Mugabe summoned all PCC chairmen to Harare in an attempt to “whip them into line” before the Congress.\(^{131}\) Masvingo and Mashonaland Central bowed to the political pressure and altered their nominations to reflect those of the other provinces. Manicaland stood its ground\(^ {132}\), refusing to rescind the nomination of Didymus Mutasa for the post of National Chairman.\(^ {133}\)

\(g\) The Dissolution of the DCCs

The recent disbanding of the DCCs may also be viewed as part of the Tsholotsho leitmotif. Several analysts have suggested that the dissolution was at the instigation of the Mujuru faction, who once again used the ruse of a constitutional amendment to undermine the Mnangagwa faction whose supporters had won the majority of places on these committees.\(^ {134}\)

Conclusion

Nominations to the ZANU PF Presidium have to date been determined, in the face of considerable resistance, by a process of “guided democracy” on instructions issued by a Politburo controlled by Mugabe. The question thus arises as to what will happen when the post to be filled is that of the “guide” - Mugabe himself. Several scenarios suggest themselves.

The first is that the democratic processes set out in the ZANU PF constitution, and sidelined by Mugabe, will be reinvigorated and activated. However, as noted above, these very processes have been altered significantly by Mugabe, who facilitated the constitutional amendment to change the Provincial Electoral Colleges from the 44 member Provincial Executive Committee to the 100 plus Provincial Coordinating Committees. Since these later committees are made up of several other elective bodies, those structures will need to be in place before a PCC can be said to be properly convened.\(^ {135}\) The costs and logistical difficulties of bringing such a large number of delegates together on short notice, and the legal complexities around the disbandment of the DCCs, may well present grounds for procedural objections, already, as noted, a weak spot of this electoral process.\(^ {136}\) Following nominations, the elaborate process of endorsement by the National People’s Conference and “election” by Congress may need to take place. All will need to be completed within the timeframe for the Parliamentary Electoral College established by the State Constitution.

\(^{130}\) See Nominations Expose ZANU PF’s True Colours 04.12.09 and Nominations expose Deep Divisions In ZANU PF 20.11.09. in The Financial Gazette.

\(^{131}\)Mugabe Tries to “Whip” Provincial Leaders into Line and Accept Nominations Zimbabwe Metro 10.12.09.

\(^{132}\) The Manicaland Provincial Chairman, Basil Nyabadza resigned over the issue, and threats of resignation also came from Provincial Chairs Lovemore Matuke (Masvingo) and John Mafa (Mashonaland West). Significantly Mnangagwa aligned John Mafa’s recent election as Provincial Chairman in Mashonaland West was strongly opposed by “old guard” ZANU PF politicians Ignatius Chombo and Webster Shamu and “young Turk” Philip Chiyangwa was barred from taking up the post of Vice Chairperson by the Politburo – see Chombo, Shamu on the Ropes The Financial Gazette 08.06.12.

\(^{133}\) Mutasa was subsequently appointed ZANU PF Administrative Secretary, 5th in the Politburo hierarchy.

\(^{134}\) DCCs Disbanded Over Succession: ZANU PF The Daily News 08.07.12. and Mugabe Flies Into Zanu PF Storm above

\(^{135}\) These issues have already been raised as difficulties in the nomination process – see for example Battle For ZANU PF Top Posts Heats Up The Herald 16.11.09.

\(^{136}\) Recently, electoral procedures within both the MDC-M/N splinter opposition party and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions have been challenged on this basis leading to fracturing of the groups.
In view of these difficulties, a second scenario may arise where the Central Committee exercises its power to amend the ZANU PF Constitution and establishes an expedited method of nomination. Thirdly, the Politburo may continue to arrogate to itself powers it does not have, as it has done under Mugabe, and direct the nomination procedure. In these latter two instances, none of these bodies is likely to speak with one voice and the process may be susceptible to legal challenge or, worse, extra juridical conflict.

With the earlier articles discussing the succession issue describing the State Constitutional provisions in this regard as “a legislative dog’s breakfast”, the provisions in the ZANU PF Constitution are thus best described as “something the cat brought in”. The combination of the two is singularly unpalatable and constitutes all the necessary ingredients for the possibility that the succession to the presidency on Mugabe’s demise may be accompanied by extraordinary unpleasantness for all concerned.
ANNEXURE A
THE POLITBURO

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<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>EXECUTIVE POST</th>
<th>POLITBURO</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bhasikiti, Kudakwashe</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>Buka, Flora</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary, Legal Affairs</td>
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<td>Gumpo, James</td>
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<td>Kasukuwere, Saviour</td>
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<td>Secretary, Indigenisation &amp; Economic Empowerment Committee Member, The Presidium</td>
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<tr>
<td>KhayaMoyo, Simon</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary, Information &amp; Publicity</td>
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<td>Masuku, Angelinah</td>
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<td>Committee Member</td>
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<td>Governor</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Disabled &amp; Disadvantaged Persons</td>
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<td>Mawema, Nelson</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Disabled &amp; Disadvantaged Persons</td>
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<td>Secretary, Legal Affairs</td>
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<td>Mpofu, Obert</td>
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<td>Secretary, Economic Affairs</td>
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<td>Muchena, Olivia</td>
<td>Minister, Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development</td>
<td>Secretary, Science &amp; Technology</td>
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<td>Muchinguri, Oppah</td>
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<td>Mudenge, Stanislaus</td>
<td>Minister, Higher and Tertiary Education</td>
<td>Secretary, External Relations</td>
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<td>First Secretary, The Presidium</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary, Transport &amp; Welfare</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary, Gender &amp; Culture</td>
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<td>Minister, Lands and Rural Resettlement</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Land &amp; Resettlement</td>
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<td>Mutasa, Didymus</td>
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<td>Muzenda, Tsitsi</td>
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<td>Ncube, Abednico</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, External Relations</td>
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<td>Ndlovu, Naison</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
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<td>Ndlovu, Richard</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Production &amp; Labour</td>
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<td>Nhema, Francis</td>
<td>Minister, Environment and Natural Management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Secretary, Environment &amp; Tourism</td>
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<td>Nkomo, John</td>
<td>Vice President &amp; Minister, State in President's Office (Healing Organ)</td>
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<td>Second Secretary, The Presidium</td>
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<td>Nyoni, Sithembiso</td>
<td>Minister, Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development</td>
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<td>Secretary, Business Development &amp; Liaison</td>
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<td>Parirenyatwa, David</td>
<td>Secretary, Health &amp; Child Welfare</td>
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<td>Sakupwanya, Stanley</td>
<td>Secretary, Welfare Of The Disabled &amp; Disadvantaged Persons</td>
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<td>Sandi Moyo, Eunice</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Women's Affairs</td>
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<td>Savanhu, Tendai</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Indigenisation &amp; Economic Empowerment</td>
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<td>Sekeramayi, Sydney</td>
<td>Minister, State for National Security in the President's Office</td>
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<td>Shamu, Webster</td>
<td>Minister, Media, Information and Publicity</td>
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<td>Secretary, Commissariat</td>
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<td>Shamuyarira, Nathan</td>
<td>Committee Member</td>
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<td>Sikhosana, Absolom</td>
<td>Secretary, Youth Affairs</td>
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<td>Tawengwa, Charles</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Finance</td>
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<td>Zhuwao, Patrick</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary, Science &amp; Technology</td>
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ANNEXURE B
PROVINCIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

1. The Provincial Executive Council

   1.1. The Chairman;
   1.2. The Vice Chairman;
   1.3. The Secretary;
   1.4. The Secretary for Finance;
   1.5. The Secretary for Commissariat;
   1.6. The Secretary for Security;
   1.7. The Secretary for Transport and Social welfare;
   1.8. The Secretary for Information and Publicity;
   1.9. The Secretary for Legal Affairs;
   1.10. The Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
   1.11. The Secretary for Production and Labour;
   1.12. The Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
   1.13. The Secretary for Economic Affairs;
   1.14. The Secretary for Education;
   1.15. The Secretary for Gender and Culture;
   1.16. The Secretary for Welfare of the Disabled and Disadvantaged Persons;
   1.17. The Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement;
   1.18. The 2 other Committee members;
   1.19. 5 Members being the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and Commissar of the Provincial Women's League;
   1.20. 5 Members being the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer and Comissar of the Provincial Youth League;
   1.21. 15 Vice-Secretaries (deputy secretaries) for offices listed in sub-sections 1.3 to 1.17.

2. Members of the Central Committee in the Province

   The CC comprises:

   2.1. President and First Secretary;
   2.2. 2 Vice Presidents and Second;
   2.3. The National Chairman of the Party;
   2.4. 130 Members who shall be allocated to the provinces in such a way and manner that each Province shall have a proportionate quota or number having regard to the census population figures in the Province: Provided that the respective Provincial Coordinating Committees shall nominate the candidates in such a way and manner that each Administrative District shall have at least one member appointed to the Central Committee;
   2.5. the Secretary for Women's Affairs;
   2.6. the Secretary for Youth Affairs;
   2.7. 17 Members representing the Women's League nominated by the League
   2.8. 17 Members representing the Youth League nominated by the League at the National Youth Conference;
2.9. 10 Members nominated by the Presidency on account of their outstanding contribution to either the armed liberation struggle of the country and/or its development after Independence;
2.10. 10 Chairpersons of the Provinces who shall be ex-officio members;
2.11. 50 Members who shall be women allocated to the Provinces in such a way and manner that each Province shall have 5 members.

3. Members of the National Consultative Assembly in the Province

The NCA comprises:

3.1. Members of the Central Committee;
3.2. Members of the National Assembly of the Women’s League.

The NAWL comprises:

3.2.1. Heads of Departments:

   The Heads of Department are:
   3.2.1.1. The Secretary for Women’s Affairs;
   3.2.1.2. The Deputy Secretary for Women’s Affairs;
   3.2.1.3. The Secretary for Administration;
   3.2.1.4. The Secretary for Finance;
   3.2.1.5. The Secretary for Commissariat;
   3.2.1.6. The Secretary for External Relations;
   3.2.1.7. The Secretary for Security;
   3.2.1.8. The Secretary for Transport and Social Welfare;
   3.2.1.9. The Secretary for Information and Publicity;
   3.2.1.10. The Secretary for Legal Affairs and Women's Rights;
   3.2.1.11. The Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
   3.2.1.12. The Secretary for Production and Labour;
   3.2.1.13. The Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
   3.2.1.14. The Secretary for Education;
   3.2.1.15. The Secretary for Gender and Culture;
   3.2.1.16. The Secretary for Welfare of the Disabled & Disadvantaged Persons;
   3.2.1.17. The Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement;
   3.2.1.18. The Secretary for Science and Technology;

3.2.2. The Heads of Departments of the Provincial Executive Committee of the Women’s League

   The Heads of Department of the PEC are
   3.2.2.1. The Chairwoman;
   3.2.2.2. The Vice Chairwoman;
   3.2.2.3. The Secretary for Administration;
   3.2.2.4. The Secretary for Commissariat;
   3.2.2.5. The Secretary for Security;
   3.2.2.6. The Secretary for Transport and Social Welfare;
   3.2.2.7. The Secretary for Information and Publicity;
   3.2.2.8. The Secretary for Legal Affairs and Women's Rights;
   3.2.2.9. The Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
   3.2.2.10. The Secretary for Production and Labour;
   3.2.2.11. The Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
3.2.3.12 The Secretary for Economic Affairs;
3.2.3.13 The Secretary for Education;
3.2.3.14 The Secretary for Gender and Culture;
3.2.3.15 The Secretary for Welfare of the Disabled and Disadvantaged Persons;
3.2.3.16 The Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement;

3.3 Members of the National Assembly of the Youth League
The NAYL comprises:
3.3.1 The Secretary for Youth Affairs;
3.3.2 The Deputy Secretary for Youth Affairs;
3.3.3 The Heads of Departments;
   The Heads of Departments are
3.3.3.1 The National Secretary for Youth Affairs;
3.3.3.2 The Deputy Secretary for Youth Affairs;
3.3.3.3 The Secretary for Administration;
3.3.3.4 The Secretary for Finance;
3.3.3.5 The Secretary for Commissariat;
3.3.3.6 The Secretary for External Relations;
3.3.3.7 The Secretary for Security;
3.3.3.8 The Secretary for Transport and Social Welfare;
3.3.3.9 The Secretary for Information and Publicity;
3.3.3.10 The Secretary for Legal Affairs;
3.3.3.11 The Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
3.3.3.12 The Secretary for Production and Labour;
3.3.3.13 The Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
3.3.3.14 The Secretary for Economic Affairs
3.3.3.15 The Secretary for Education;
3.3.3.16 The Secretary for Gender and Culture;
3.3.3.17 The Secretary for Welfare of the Disabled and Disadvantaged Persons;
3.3.3.18 The Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement;

3.3.4 The Heads of Departments of the Provincial Executive Committee of the Youth League.
   The Heads of Department of the PEC are:
3.3.5.1. The Provincial Chairman;
3.3.5.2. The Deputy Provincial Chairman;
3.3.5.3. The Provincial Secretary for Administration;
3.3.5.4. The Provincial Secretary for Finance;
3.3.5.5. The Provincial Secretary for Commissariat;
3.3.5.6. The Provincial Secretary for Security;
3.3.5.7. The Provincial Secretary for Transport and Social Welfare;
3.3.5.8. The Provincial Secretary for Information and Publicity;
3.3.5.9. The Provincial Secretary for Legal Affairs;
3.3.5.10. The Provincial Secretary for Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment;
3.3.5.11. The Provincial Secretary for Production and Labour;
3.3.5.12. The Provincial Secretary for Health and Child Welfare;
3.3.5.13. The Provincial Secretary for Economic Affairs;
3.3.5.14. The Provincial Secretary for Education;
3.3.5.15. The Provincial Secretary for Gender and Culture;
3.3.5.16. The Provincial Secretary for the Disabled and Disadvantaged Persons;
3.3.5.17. The Provincial Secretary for Land Reform and Resettlement.

4. **Provincial Executive Committees of the Women’s League.**

4.1 This includes all the heads of department mentioned under the National Assembly plus all deputies to those heads.

5. **Provincial Executive Committees of the Youth League.**

5.1 This includes all the heads of department mentioned under the National Assembly plus all deputies to those heads.

6. **Party Members of Parliament from the Province.**

7. **The Chairpersons of District Coordinating Committees from the Province.**

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**ANNEXURE C**

**HISTORY OF THE ZANU PF PRESIDUIM**

1. **President**
   - a) Robert Mugabe 1987 – present

2. **Vice-President (ZAPU)**
   - b) Joseph Msika December 1999 - August 2009
   - c) John Nkomo December 2009 - present

3. **Vice-President (ZANU)**
   - b) JoiceMujuru December 2004 - present.

4. **National Chairman.**
   - c) Simon KhayaMoyo 2009 - present